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 How architecture affords being-in-the-world? This seemingly 
simple yet pervasive question within architectural scholarship and 
practice has been reinvigorated in recent years through the embodied 
and experiential turn i.e., a paradigmatic turn highlighting the primacy of  
the body and experience as drivers of  architectural design. This steady 
infusion of  architectural research with the insights, theories, and methods 
from embodied cognition, philosophy of  mind, ecological psychology, 
and neuroscience, among other fields, is clearly reflected in the theme of  
this symposium and the contributions gathered on the following pages. 
 The essay by Sarah Robinson directly addresses this question right 
from the opening, illuminating quote by John Hejduk. The evoked image 
Introduction: Designing Affordances for the Living-Lived Body?
Andrea Jelić
of  a ‘rocking chair as the soul of  the porch’ helps unfold the relationship 
between the body, mind, and environment as one of  life, in its full biological 
and phenomenological sense. By recasting—or better yet, reminding—
the reader that architecture should be thought of  in terms of  relations, 
connections, processes, couplings of  action and movement, Robinson 
places the concept of  affordances in a natural relationship to design. In 
her account, performative and generative affordances are proposed as a 
way to focus designers’ thinking on the body acting, interacting, and living 
in space. Tracing a similar line of  thought, Harry Mallgrave’s essay calls 
for a shift of  prevailing, albeit misconceived, priorities of  architectural 
profession by moving from ‘object to experience’ way of  understanding and 
designing architecture. To design and create built environments fit for the 
human organism as a whole (i.e., as a multisensory, emotional, hormonal, 
social, and cultural bodily subject) is a forgotten task of  architects (perhaps 
an ethical one?) to secure our way of  being-in-the-world as living, feeling, 
encultured organisms—our ‘paradise on earth’. According to Mallgrave, 
the notion of  affordances thereby highlights the relational nature between 
the built space and the human being as attunement with action-related 
prospects in organism’s spatial surroundings. The third and last essay by 
James R. Hamilton rounds off  this discussion by raising two significant 
questions. The first question on whether affordances can be perceived 
by users in a particular, predesignated manner, pinpoints to an important 
consideration of  complementarity between materialized intentionality 
of  a designer and a perceiver’s intentionality as an ability to act on an 
affordances. Hamilton’s second question of  what kind of  ‘data’ would be 
of  need and help to designers to ensure an intended action on a designed 
affordance hints at the complexity of  design process, and in particular the 
task of  translating the multiplicity of  affordances available to human form 
of  life into architectural and urban environments. 
 Accordingly, I would suggest that the allure and promise of  the 
concept of  affordances is twofold. Firstly, it emphasizes the interdependent, 
relational connection between the bodily subject and the environment in a 
way that brings forth an understanding of  architecture and designed spaces 
as a set—or to borrow Rietveld and Kiverstein’s term—a rich ‘landscape 
of  affordances’ (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014). This relational stance can 
be further valued for its correspondence to the long standing tradition 
of  phenomenological thought in architectural scholarship arguing that 
Figure 1.0: The MIT Chapel (built in 1956), was designed by architect Eero Saarinen as 
a religious place, but without particular denomination. A small round brick building, 
it is recognized as an efficacious model of mid-century modern. Saarinen creates 
a palpable experience manifesting or affording a humanity through the shadows, 
twinkle of the suspending sculpture behind an altar, the light descending from oculus 
above, the reflected light from the water outside highlighting the undulating brick 






































such connectedness between the inhabitant and the space is a prime 
characteristics of  what means to dwell and to be in the world. Secondly, 
the notion of  affordances—with its origin in ecological psychology, but 
readily taken within other fields such as neuroscience—shows a promise 
of  a shared vocabulary that can ease the bridging between architecture 
and cognitive science disciplines, and thereby, possibly provide a way to 
operationalize the investigation of  architecture-body relationship. Several 
illustrative examples of  this dialogue readily spring to mind, including 
the ‘End of  Sitting’ (figure 1.1) and ‘Hardcore Heritage’ design projects 
by RAAAF, informed and shaped by ecological-enactive cognition 
framework (Rietveld & Rietveld, 2017; Rietveld, Rietveld, Mackic, Waalwijk 
Van Doorn, & Bervoets, 2015); a set of  empirical studies by ecological 
psychologists exploring children’s perception and engagement with play 
affordances based on well-known Aldo van Eyck’s playgrounds (Withagen 
& Caljouw, 2017); or a recent neuroscientific study of  sensorimotor brain 
dynamics in relation to architectural affordances (Djebbara, Fich, Petrini, 
& Gramann, 2019).
 Taken in sum, these three essays clearly indicate the value of  
considering the concept of  affordances in the context of  architecture, 
and provide a valuable contribution to this discussion of  how to conceive, 
think, and design the inherent coupling between the human organism and 
the environment. 
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1. John Hejduk, Such Places as Memory: Poems, 1953-1996, Boston, MIT, 1998, 39.
Articulating Affordances: Towards a New Theory of Design
Sarah Robinson
The rocking chair is the soul of  the porch.
Remove it and all you have left is white
pine for the carpenter ants.
-John Hejduk1
 The poet’s gift is to distill the essence of  something complex to 
a few lines. Here the poet is also an architect who, seemingly innocent of  
the pretenses that burden his profession, gets straight to the point. The 
rocking chair unites body with place, makes the porch a place fit for human 
habitation.  Yet, in architecture we have little regard for chairs, much less 
those that rock, and we certainly no longer speak of  souls. That a rocking 
chair could be the soul of  the porch is contrary to everything we learn 
in architecture school. We are still taught according to the Renaissance 
conception that understands man as the subject and the world and nature 
as objects—one that renders architecture a static form in which other, 
lesser objects are contained; not something to be inhabited, but an object 
to be fetishized from afar. I remember feeling annoyed when I was asked 
to do a furniture layout in my floor plan because I did not want to be 
mistaken for an interior designer, so thoroughly did I swallow the tacit 
notion that the almighty realm of  architecture did not bother with matters 
so mundane.
 But here, Hejduk suggests another alternative: the chair rocks in 
rhythm to our movement, and this rocking is the beating heart of  the 
porch. This is more than the subject, the hypertrophic “I” encountering 
an inert object, it is a fusion of  subject and object in their mutual animacy, 
as well as the fusion of  form and function: the form of  the porch at the 
outcropping of  the building affords a place for a chair, which in turn 
affords rocking, which in turn releases cascades of  pleasure and relaxation 
in our body, which in turn adjusts our affective state, which then modulates 
our attitude towards the world. Without the chair, there is no possibility 
for human habitation—the chair renders an otherwise inert object into 
a building/porch/chair/body/pleasure system. This example provides a 
way of  thinking about architecture not in terms of  objects within objects, 
but in terms of  relationships, links, connections, couplings of  action 
and movement. Architecture and furnishing are no longer completely 
distinct, nor are environment and action, nor are form and function; 
here architecture is understood as a matrix of  dynamic interdependent 
relationships.
 To truly understand architecture as a verb—as the dynamic 
tissue of  connection, means rethinking some of  the basic tenets that our 
profession holds so dear. And this rethinking is also a reimagining—one 
that calls us to leave behind familiar terrain so that we might return to it 






































onwith fresh eyes. And thankfully there are those who have forged ahead of  
us who can serve as our guides along the way. J. J. Gibson and his partner 
Eleanor are two such pioneers, their discovery of  ecological perception, 
which was radical in their time, is the consensus view of  perception held 
today. Yet, in the intervening five decades we have scarcely considered 
the implications of  their theories for architectural design. Truly reckoning 
with the profoundly ecological nature of  the way we exist in the world 
means that we must reimagine our discipline on terms of  movement 
rather than stasis, embedded umwelts rather than from isolated atoms, 
verbs instead of  nouns—to go from form to forming, from opposition 
to complementarity, from space to place, from time to occasion, from 
anonymity to atmosphere and from abstractions to affordances.
From Vitruvius to the Body Electric
 The most basic ground of  our inquiry must begin with the way 
we understand our bodies. If  you think I am exaggerating when I claim 
that architectural thinking still adheres to an obsolete paradigm, consider 
the way we continue to conceive of  the human body, the rightful subject 
of  our architectural designs. The Vitruvian man splayed over a geometric 
grid is the primary image that has guided our discipline for centuries, even 
though the context from which that ideal arose has radically changed. For 
Vitruvius the ideal proportions of  architecture derived from the ideal 
proportions of  the human body. In his Ptolemaic world picture, cosmic 
proportions were reiterated in the natural world, the human body was 
considered the most perfect expression of  natural and cosmic order and 
was understood in terms of  this larger system. The Renaissance reaffirmed 
the Vitruvian ideal considering man as the measure of  all things; and it is 
important to remember that the essential meaning of  the word measure 
meant ‘boundary‘ or ‘limit’—measure implied moderation, and had a 
relative and qualitative, as well as a quantitative meaning. Beauty, wisdom 
and health were the consequences of  moderation, mental and physical 
balance was the consequence of  having everything in its proper measure. 
By the time Le Corbusier’s modulor man arrived, the body had been 
reduced to a static yardstick—and “ideal” proportions were exemplified 
a 6’0” tall male body builder. The body had long since been torn from its 
biological and cosmic matrix, and was considered to be a machine. We lost 
the sense of  measure as a boundary and a proportion and retained only its 
2. Urla & Swedlund, (2000) “The anthropometry of  Barbie. Unsettling ideals of  the femi-
nine body in popular culture” from Schiebinger, L, Feminism and the Body, 412.
quantitative significance, which for centuries was considered to be of  only 
secondary importance. 
 Understanding the body not as a complex and dynamic boundary, 
but as an object among objects specified by its outward quantitative 
specifications is a habit of  thinking that we have yet to fully overcome. 
Consider the example of  study conducted by the Cleveland School of  
Medicine2 in 1943 whose goal was to determine the dimensions of  the 
average or “normal” woman. In order to do this, they averaged the data 
gathered on 15,0000 young adult women and created the statue named 
“Norma” (Figure 2.1 and 2.2). To their surprise, they found that less 
than one percent of  the actual women came even close to matching even 
half  of  Norma’s dimensions. Seven years later, the US Air Force, in their 
effort to understand why so many of  their fighter jets were crashing—
sometimes up to 17 times per day—deduced that perhaps the cockpits 
were no longer sized to fit the pilots. In high speed, fast acting situations, 
the cockpit and the pilot demanded a hand in glove fit. Figure 2.3. To test 
their hypothesis, they conducted a study to find the size of  the average 
pilot. In their analysis of  the bodily dimensions of  4063 men, they found 
Figure 2.1: Woman being measured during 
the Cleveland Health Museum Contest
Figure 2.2: The End of Average Statue at 






































3. Todd Rose, The End of  Average, New York: Harper Collins, 2016. 
that not a single pilot fit within an average range on all 10 dimensions, and 
less than 3.5 percent were “average” on only three dimensions.3 Like the 
story of  Norma before them, they found that not one living breathing pilot 
matched the average. But, unlike the Norma study, they did not blame the 
actual, living breathing women for not matching the ideal—instead, they 
innovated. They designed adjustable hand controls, seats, foot pedals, all 
the features that are now standard equipment not only in cockpits, but in 
every automobile.
 Today, thanks to breakthroughs in the biological sciences we 
now have a more refined understanding of  the astonishing sensitivity and 
connectedness of  the human organism than ever before. Not only can 
the body not be reduced to a static Platonic form, or crunched into a 
norm, the body is inseparable from the environments that we inhabit, and 
inextricably bound to the interpersonal, social and cultural relationships 
on which our lives depend. Our bodies do not stop at the surface of  our 
skin. As the ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson said five decades ago, “The 
surface of  an organism, it should be remembered, is actually a boundary 
between the organism and its environment, and the boundary is not always 
or everywhere as clean-cut as the hairless human philosopher tends to 
4. J.J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Long Grove, Illinois Waveland 
Press 1966, p. 101.
5. Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of  Animals and Humans: With a Theory of  Mean-
ing, Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota, 2010, 1.
think.”4 Indeed, the old dualisms between body/mind/world have finally 
given way to an understanding of  the living human organism embedded 
interactively in our environments. Our images of  the body must begin to 
express this body/mind/ecological system. Even the Air Force figured 
out seven decades ago, that we need to design for a moving, dynamic 
body—but now we must go further, to design for a vulnerable, aging, 
multi-gendered body extending interdependently into its surroundings—
one that by its very nature cannot be reduced to a static ideal.
From One Size Fits All to Umwelt 
 J.J. Gibson would perhaps have appreciated the example of  
cockpit redesign, because implicit in the story is that the capabilities of  the 
pilot were constrained or afforded by the design of  the cockpit. Optimal 
performance depended upon the appropriate fit between the pilot’s body 
and the controls of  the airplane. The cockpit is a very real extension of  
the pilot’s body, enabling both to do what neither could do alone. One 
could even say that the cockpit is the pilot’s umwelt. Umwelt5, which is 
German for life-world, is a term the Estonian biologist Jakob Von Uexküll 
coined to express how an animal cannot be understood apart from its 
particular environment. While many animals share the same habitat, each 
is tuned to that habitat in its own particular way. A spider is sensitive to the 
forces and features of  the habitat relevant to its own particular needs. To 
truly understand the spider’s lifeworld, we would have to experience that 
world the way that a spider does. It is impossible to truly understand an 
animal apart from the environment in which that animal evolved and to 
whose features its perceptual systems have adapted. 
 Of  course we human animals also occupy our own lifeworlds, 
our perceptual bandwidth is not tuned to ultraviolet light like the spiders, 
nor do we sense ultrasonic sound like dogs can, our lifeworlds emerge 
according to our own particular needs and purposes. This is another way 
in which our sensorimotor and perceptual systems extend into, and are 
reciprocally conditioned by our lifeworlds; and it is exactly this mutuality 
that J.J. Gibson devoted his lifework to elaborating. His ecological model 
of  perception challenged traditional cognitive theories of  perception and 
laid the foundation for today’s embedded, embodied, enactive, extended 
theories of  cognition—his ecological model of  perception was the original 
“E.”
Figure 2.3: Shown here is a Spitfire cockpit for fighter pilots as the early archetype for the 






































6. J.J. Gibson, Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, New York, Psychology Press, 1979, 
127.
7. J. Scott Turner, The Extended Organism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press, 2000, 3.
 It is interesting that Gibson undertook much of  his early work on 
perception during his tenure as the director of  the Aviation Psychology 
Program during the Second World War. His theory of  perception as the 
active, direct extraction of  information from an ambient flow of  energy 
grew out of  his interest in trying to understand how pilots were able to 
accomplish skilled flight, which the then prevailing notions of  perception 
failed explain. The skilled sensorimotor coupling essential to aircraft 
flight remained a stirring question to him, and perhaps contributed to his 
later introduction of  the notion of  affordances, the key to understanding 
his ecological psychology. Gibson defined an affordance quite broadly 
as a possibility for action in the environment that refers “to both the 
environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies 
the complementarity of  the animal and the environment.”6 Affordances 
refined and textured Von Uexküll’s umwelt by articulating the concrete 
and specific features of  the life-world that constrain or afford behavior, 
which then leads to modulations and changes to both organism and 
environment in a complementarily manner. Returning to our earlier 
example, the pilot’s umwelt is detailed and furnished with the tools, 
levers, seats and mechanisms complementary to the pilot’s sensorimotor 
perceptual systems, the two systems are united via the pilot’s actions 
which those details and furnishings enable and allow—understood in 
this way affordances serve as the connective tissue between animal and 
environment.
Extended Organisms - Nested Dynamic Systems
 Taking seriously the implications of  the co-emergent coupling of  
organism and umwelt, leads to some rather startling conclusions. In his 
book, The Extended Organism, the physiological ecologist J. Scott Turner 
meticulously illustrates how animals exploit the physical properties of  their 
surroundings to their advantage, posing the deceptively simple question: 
“Are animal-built structures properly things external to the animals that 
built them, or are they properly parts of  the animals themselves?”7 Where 
do we draw the line between organism proper and the organisms’ umwelt? 
If  we choose to draw the line at the envelope of  the organism’s body, we 
find that this outermost layer is quite permeable, allowing a steady influx 
of  matter and energy to flow through it. Cut off  the flow of  energy and 
the organism will perish. “It is not the boundary itself  that makes the 
organism distinctive,” he writes, “but what that boundary does. In other 
words, the boundary is not a thing, but a process.”8 He illustrates how 
earthworms manipulate the physical properties of  the soil to serve as an 
accessory kidney, how mole crickets construct trumpet shaped burrows 
that help amplify the sound of  their mating calls and how the spectacular 
mound nests of  African termites not only house the colony, but serve 
as gas-exchange systems allowing them to adapt to a wide-range of  
environmental conditions—effectively extending their physiology in the 
structures they build. 
 The slipperiness of  the line between organism and environment 
has been importantly elaborated by philosopher Andy Clark, who with 
David Chalmers introduced the Extended Mind hypothesis in 1998, 
asserting that body/brain/world involve a dynamic system. He argues 
his case citing the example of  the bluefin tuna (Figure 2.4) who also 
treats the environment as an equal partner.  According to studies by fluid 
dynamicists, the anatomy and musculature of  the tuna render it physically 
incapable of  swimming as fast as it does. Tunas reach their remarkable 
speeds by sensing naturally occurring currents, and using their tails to create 
additional vortices that propel them faster than their strictly physiological 
capabilities alone would allow. Clark writes, “The real ‘swimming machine’ 
therefore, is not the tuna alone, but the tuna in its ‘proper context’—the 
tuna, plus the water, plus the vortices it creates and exploits.”9
8. Ibid 
9. Andy Clark, Mindware: An introduction to Cognitive Science, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001, 272.
Figure 2.4: Pacific Bluefin Tuna uses water to propel its body at 







































10. J.J. Gibson, Ecological Approach, 9. 
11. J.J. Gibson, Reasons for Realism, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
Publishers,1982, 413.
12. J.J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, New York: Houghlin Mifflin1966, 
285.
13. In design the notable contributions have been: Donald Norman, The Design of  Everyday 
Things, New York: Basic Books, 2002.
14. In architecture the notable contributions have been: Eric and Ronald Rietveld, www.
raaaf.nl.
 If  we understand the structures we build not as inert objects 
but as physiological extensions and amplifications of  our own capacities, 
that is, if  our buildings are to us, as the cockpit is to the pilot; we must 
consider them in terms of  a nested dynamic body/brain/building system. 
And, to get at the full import of  what Gibson meant by an affordance, 
we must understand an affordance as it is positioned—that is nested—
within the context of  a dynamic system. The units of  measure used in 
physics made no sense in Gibson’s terrestrial ecology. “The components 
and events of  the environment fall into natural units. These units are 
nested. They should not be confused with the metric units of  space and 
time.”10 Gibson consistently referred to affordances in terms of  spatial 
and temporal nesting—places are nested within other places, events are 
nested within other events: “For perception this nesting is what counts, 
not the metric dimensions of  empty time with its arbitrary instants and 
durations. Time as such, like space is not perceived.”11 The relative and 
qualitative dimensions of  measure are here restored, umwelt and organism 
are scaled and tempered according to each other. Gibson’s affordances 
provide an alternative to the conceit of  a static ideal, to the absolutes of  
space and time—affordances are inherently situated, dynamic, relational, 
complementary and embodied.
Towards a New Theory of Design
 In 1976, Gibson opened his talk at a symposium entitled 
“Perception in Architecture” by declaring that, “Architecture and design 
do not have a satisfactory theoretical basis. Can an ecological approach to 
the psychology of  the perception and behavior provide it?” Because this a 
rare instance in which Gibson addressed the concerns of  architecture most 
directly, focusing on and developing these points can be particularly useful 
because it is here that Gibson proposed that affordances could provide 
a foundation for a reinvigorated theory of  design. “The hypothesis that 
things have affordances, and that we perceive or learn to perceive them, 
is very promising, radical, but not yet elaborated.”12 What would it mean 
to elaborate or articulate affordances, and how would that provide a 
15. J.J. Gibson, 1982, 413.
16. As quoted by David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, London: Routledge, 1995, 
12.
17. Klee, Paul. Notebooks: Volume 2: The Nature of  Nature, London, Lund Humphries, 1973, 
269.
18. J.J. Gibson, 1982, 413.
sound theoretical foundation for architecture? There has of  course been 
considerable work done in elaborating affordances in design, cognitive 
science, architecture,13 dynamic systems theory14  that we can build upon 
in this effort. But for now, let’s take Gibson words directly: “Things will 
look as they do because they afford what they do . . . Herein lies the 
possibility for a new theory of  design. We modify the substances and 
surfaces of  our environment for the sake of  what they will afford, not for 
the sake of  creating good forms as such, abstract forms, mathematic and 
elegant forms, esthetically pleasing forms. The forms of  Euclid and his 
geometry, abstracted by Plato to the immaterial level, have to be rooted 
in substances and surfaces and layouts that constrain locomotion and 
permit or prevent our actions.”15 What about this statement constitutes a 
new theory of  design? First let us clarify what exactly we mean by theory 
which derives from the Greek theoria, and shares the same root as theatre. 
Theory is rooted in the meaning ‘to view, to make a spectacle, to speculate.” 
So, if  we take theory to mean a certain view of  things and understand 
architecture according to Gibson’s way of  seeing, that is through the 
filter of  ecological perception, some basic architectural principles assume 
a completely new meaning. To design things for the sake of  what they 
will afford, not for how they look, but for what they do, would go far 
beyond the dictum that form follows function, to imply that form itself  is 
a verb—form forms. The shape of  things, shape our movements, invite or 
disclose possibilities—are worn and grooved by the shape of  our habits. 
Here Gibson intends form in the Aristotelian sense, form not as outward 
and fixed, but form as process— “an inner forming activity which is the 
cause of  the growth of  things”16 Or, as Paul Klee put it—“form is the 
end, death, form-giving is life.”17
 According to Gibson, architects have misunderstood form 
because they have been taught form as a graphic exercise, treating form 
as a painter would treat form. In this way, “No one is ever going to 
understand “form” . . . the use of  the term only promotes confusion.”18 
Indeed, how many architecture schools still engage in formal exercises—
carving styrofoam solids, and manipulating the cube may have their value 
as playful, creative experiments, but they perpetuate the obsolete notion 
that the goal of  architecture is to dress up and hollow out a Platonic 







































20. Juhani Pallasmaa, Architecture as Experience: The Fusion of  the World and the Self, Architec-
tural Research in Finland, Vol. 2, no.1 2018
21. Gibson, 1982, 416.
insisted—death. “What architects are concerned about,” said Gibson, “is 
the layout of  surfaces.”19 And to consider surfaces in the way that Gibson 
intended—that is, trading the word layout for “formal arrangement”, 
replacing the noun form with substance, reserving the word form for use 
only in its active sense—would be radical indeed. And going a step further, 
what if  we understood surfaces not for what they are, but for what they 
do. Treating surfaces as boundaries that are, like we must now understand 
the boundary of  our skin, not as things but as processes—surfaces as the 
site of  intense interactions.
Primacy of Movement 
 Gibson’s ecological model is inherently dynamic, so it is not 
surprising that he proclaimed, “Architects need to pay attention to the 
affordances of  locomotion and action in the layouts they design.” The 
long practiced but shortsighted goal to produce “esthetically pleasing 
forms” rests on an obsolete understanding of  perception, one that 
considers the static picture as the rule, rather than an exception—this 
is exactly the model that Gibson overturned more than fifty years ago. 
Perceiving is active, exploratory and sequential, “We are never frozen in 
the moment,” as Gibson insisted, what we see when we look around, 
“Is not a patchwork of  forms but the possibilities of  support, of  falling, 
of  resting, of  sitting, of  resting . . . of  taking shelter.” Similarly, Juhani 
Pallasmaa has long advocated for understanding architecture as a verb, 
“Its true essence is always an invitation to action. It is this verb-like 
tendency towards active search and exploration that unites architecture 
and the human mind.”20 His statement echoes Gibson’s insistence on 
the exploratory nature of  perception, when we move through places 
we are searching for, “The possibility of  entering the next vista.”21  We 
now know that every act of  perception is also an act of  the imagination, 
that the two faculties share an inseparably common ground, and we 
are beginning to appreciate the extent to which they are both rooted in 
movement. Not only is movement primary to architectural experience, 
movement is primordial to thought and feeling. Gibson’s refusal to 
relegate the mental and the physical to opposing realms has now found a 
wealth of  empirical corroboration. Numerous studies have documented 
the complementarity between posture and gesture and thought and 
feeling. Assuming various poses triggers changes in our endochrine 
22. Amy Cuddy’s Ted talk: “Your Body Language May Shape Who You Are”
23. Colin Ellard, Places of  the Heart: The Psychogeograohy of  Everyday Life, New York: Bellevue 
Litrary Press, 2015, 23 
24. Z. Djebbara, L. B. Fich, L. Petrini, K. Gramann, Sensorimotor brain dynamics reflect 
architectural affordances. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 116, 14769–14778 (2019).
system that match the import of  the gesture, striking a Wonder Woman 
pose, for example, literally makes us feel more powerful.22 As Colin 
Ellard has noted, “We feel because we do.”23 Gesture and posture 
have their own complex emotional and chemical signature. Further, 
a recent neuroscience experiment indicated that cortical potentials 
vary as a function of  bodily affordances available in the physical 
environment, implying that cognition is intimately related to potential 
bodily movements24 (Figure 2.5). Gibson also confirmed that knowledge 
unfolds through movement. We learn places by moving through them, 
places are disclosed through successive opening of  vistas and he 
Figure 2.5: This double image compares the syncopation of  Peter 
Zumthor’s Serpentine Gallery, 2011, hallway (https://golfatech.
weebly.com/design-studio/archives/01-2015) with the multiple 
impression of  a walking dancer, presenting the case of  how we 
actually see ourselves in space  (https://www.ted.com/talks/
amy_cuddy_your_body_language_may_shape_who_you_are).  In 
other words, we see ourselves not in still frames of  a photograph-






































oninsisted that we not only perceive, but proprioceive.25 This reiterates the 
philosopher-dancer-biologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s assertion that, 
“What is distinctive about thinking in movement is not that the flow of  
thought is kinetic, but that thought itself  is. It is motional through and 
through.”26 Both our most humble and noble capacities are saturated 
with movement; it is indeed the very sign of  life.
Experiential Space                                                                                                                
 The metrics of  Gibson’s terrestrial ecology were not those 
applied in the physical sciences, they were nested units whose values were 
always relative, that is, relational. The obstacle to thoroughly applying a 
relational understanding to architecture is that we continue to assume 
along with classical physics that the universe consists of  isolated bodies 
in space. Gibson was constantly trying to get us to break this habit, 
“What we perceive first of  all is not abstract color and space . . . but 
surfaces and their layout.” Space is a term that reverberates through 
 We now understand space as layered energetic envelopes that 
are extensions of  our nervous systems, known as peripersonal and 
extrapersonal space. Our experience of  space is conditioned by our 
emotional and somatic states—this again has been confirmed by numerous 
studies. We now know that hills seem steeper to a person wearing a 
heavy backpack28 and to someone who is hungry or not physcially fit.29 
Another amazing example of  how we extend into the space around us, 
comes again from the world of  aviation. Because flying an aircraft relies 
almost exclusively on visual perception, many of  the problems occur 
when atmospheric conditions impair a pilot’s vision. This is another 
affirmation of  Gibson’s insistence that we do not perceive space, indeed, 
without reference points that are scaled to the human perceptual field, 
we cannot perform even the most basic tasks, much less fly an airplane. 
To address this problem, the U.S. Air Force augmented visual perception 
by devising the Tactile Situation Awareness System; which is a full-body 
suit pilots wear with “tactile simulators” integrated inside it. (Figure. 2.6) 
The garment delivers small puffs of  air controlled by complex sensors 
that correspond to various flight parameters, the airspeed, the way the 
plane is tilting, etc. The pilot feels a puff  of  air on the side of  her body 
that corresponds to the direction of  the tilt, and adjusts the plane in that 
direction to make the puff  on her body disappear. The body feels as the 
plane moves. Notice how they choose their words carefully—this is not 
a garment, but a system that includes situational conditions; velocity, 
atmospheric pressure, oncoming threats, the aircraft, the suit, the pilot, 
the controls. This system is so effective that even inexperienced pilots can 
perform difficult tasks while blindfolded. The space of  the aircraft and 
the space of  the body morph into a shared dance—the connective tissue 
between them is the TSAS suit that affords flight.
Time as Event                                                                                                                              
 And of  course we cannot properly understand space without 
addressing the problem of  time. Indeed, Gibson did not see time or 
space as problems per se, but as underdeveloped concepts in need of  
reinterpretation in terms of  ecological perception: “Perceptual research 
needs a program newer than the one formulated in Newton’s Principles and 
28. Bhalla, M., & Proffitt, D. R. (1999). Visual–motor recalibration in geographical slant 
perception. Journal of  Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. 25(4), 
1076–1096.
29. Dario Krpan & Simone Schnall. When perception says no to action: Approach cues 
make step hills appear even steeper. Journal of  Experimental Social Psychology 55:89-98. 
November 2014.
the halls of  architecture schools, yet absolute space is an abstraction 
borrowed from physics, and like pure form, has little practical value to 
an architect. Along with space and form, we architects also idolize light, 
but as Gibson insisted, we can never see light itself—we see gradients, 
discontinuities in an array of  light as it moves through and along surfaces, 
substances and their layout. Gibson broke down the architect’s triad of  
pet preoccupations: space, form and light into living, breathing human 
dimensions.                                                                                      
Figure 2.6: A graphic representation of “tactile situation 
awareness system.”27
25. Gibson, 1982, 416.
26.  Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Primacy of  Movement, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pub-
lishing, 1999, 486. 
27. Kelley, A. M., Newman, R. L., Lawson, B. D., & Rupert, A. H. (2014). A materiel 
solution to aircraft upset. Proceedings of  the American Institute of  Aeronautics and 





































onLocke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding.”30 This inherited conceptual 
framework is unfit to speak of  human experience—we need to develop 
a vocabulary for understanding time scaled to human perception. We 
do not experience abstractions—like space and time—what we do 
experience are places and events and both are co-perceived. In terms of  
ecological perception, we experience time as change, animate movement 
and flow—and he called all such changes, events.31 The notion of  empty 
time, as if  time is somehow a container that must be filled is alien to 
human experience. And this idea, again, is based on an outdated division 
between mental and physical realms. Our awareness of  the environment, 
which both persists and changes is simultaneous with our awareness of  
our persistent and changing self—our self-awareness and environmental 
awareness are complementary, concurrent and interdependent. Awareness 
of  events therefore seamlessly encompasses psychic and physical 
dimensions. Memory and imagination are triggered by and nested in place. 
Our memory of  an event arises simultaneously with the living context 
in which the event took place. What then, does this entail for architects? 
Gibson, in his very matter of  fact manner, insisted that our concern must 
be with surfaces and substances and their layout—I would suggest that 
humanizing time has very much to do with the manner in which we treat 
these surfaces and substances—texture captures light by casting shadows 
and seeming to slow down light’s passage, smooth surfaces reflect light in 
a blinding glare, a candle’s glow casts the halo that transforms an event 
into an occasion. The play of  light is time’s humane messenger.
Articulating Affordances                                                                                            
 Now that we have updated some longstanding issues in 
architecture: understood form as process, affirmed the verb-like, 
dynamic nature of  architecture, movement as characteristic of  thought, 
feeling and experience, established the complementarity of  organism/
umwelt proportioned in nested units, the extended, plastic nature of  our 
perceptual systems and the experiential nature of  space and time—we can 
take a fresh look at Gibson’s claim that affordances offered a basis for a 
reinvigorated theory of  design. Gibson acknowledged that affordances 
were not without their precedents, and explicitly stated that the term is 
reminiscent of  aufforderungscharakter, a German term Kurt Lewin 
coined that has been translated to English as invitation-character (by 
J.F.Brown in 1929) and later as valence (by D.K. Adams in 1931) and later 
by Gestalt psychologists as demand-character.32 Although he followed a 
similar line of  theoretical development, Gibson contrasted affordances by 
giving them an independent character. Affordances were invariant features 
of  the environment that did not change as the observer changed—the 
edibility of  a substance does not depend on the animal’s hunger but 
rather offers what it does, because of  what it is. “The affordances of  
the environment are permanent, although they do refer to animal and are 
species-specific. The positive and negative valence of  things that change 
when the internal state of  the observer changes are temporary. The 
perception of  what something affords should not be confused with the 
“coloring” of  experience by needs and motives. Tastes and preferences 
fluctuate, something that look goods today may look bad tomorrow 
but what it actually offers the observer will be the same.”33 Endowing 
affordances with this invariant character enabled Gibson to resolve 
the subjective-objective duality that plagued the Gestalt psychologists 
forty years before him. Possibilities for action exist in the environment 
regardless of  your mood or fleeting physiological state. On this Gibson 
was very clear: “Affordances are invariant combinations of  properties of  
32. Gibson, 1982, 409.
33. Ibid, 410.
Figure 2.7: Cover of Desert Works by Rick Joy, Steven Holl, and Juhani Pallasmaa. Courtesy 
of our friend Rick Joy






































onthings (properties at the ecological level) taken with reference to a species 
or an individual. I now add: with reference to its needs (biological as well 
as social) as well as to its action-systems and its anatomy. The affordances 
for behavior and the behaving animal are complementary.”34
Atmospheres and Attunement                                                                                                     
 In order to articulate affordances, due attention must be given 
to the nature of  atmospheres, as atmospheres and affordances share 
critical common ground: “An important fact about the affordances of  
the environment is that they are in a sense objective, real, and physical, 
unlike values and meanings, which are often supposed to be subjective, 
phenomenal, and mental. But, actually, an affordance is neither an 
objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if  you like. An 
affordance cuts across the dichotomy of  subjective/objective and helps 
us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of  the environment 
and a fact of  behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An 
affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the observer.”35 
The key overlap between atmospheres and affordances is the manner in 
which they both baffle the categories of  subject and object and the physical 
and psychical and for this reason, both notions have given architects a way 
to think beyond the divide. Our language and philosophy have been so 
shaped by the dichotomy that any tendency to conflate affordances and 
atmospheres, is an indication of  the poverty of  our alternatives. And it 
this poverty, I think that makes it important to articulate and enrich our 
vocabulary of  alternatives, and for this reason it is helpful to distinguish 
between the two.                                                                                           
 What if  we understand an atmosphere as an irreducible quality 
of  experience that is neither subjective or objective but a dynamic fusion 
of  both. Tonino Griffero characterizes atmospheres as quasi-things36 to 
acknowledge the way in which atmospheres are “out there” in the world. 
I would compare the ontological status of  atmospheres to that of  color
—Merleau Ponty’s37 paradigmatic example of  the way perception works. 
Color, like light and sound and mood is immersive, lacks a front and a 
34. Ibid. 
35. Gibson, J.J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Miff-
lin.129.
36. Tonino Griffero, Architectural Affordances: the Atmospheric Authority of  Spaces in Architecture 
and Atmospheres, Tapio Wirkkala-Rut Bryk Design Reader, ed. Philip Tidwell, Helsinki, FI 
2014.
37. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of  Perception, trans., Colin Smith, New York, 
Routledge, 2002.
back, does not obey perspective, is multidirectional, multisensorial, cannot 
be contained or reduced to its component parts without losing its life. 
What if  we think of  atmosphere as a general term whose manifestations 
include light and sound, scent and feeling—all of  these are fluid and 
permeable and have moving, temporal qualities.       
 In an affirmation of  their undeniably pervasive physical presence, 
Griffero has also advanced the notion that atmospheres have affordances.38 
Yet, taking Gibson at his word, it seems doubtful that he would have gone 
quite so far. Gibson categorized affordances as objects, substances, places, 
events, other people, animals, but he clearly stated that affordances, “Are 
not phenomenal qualities of  subjective experiences (tertiary qualities, 
dynamic and physiognomic properties, etc.) I also assume that they 
are not the physical properties of  things as now conceived by physical 
science. Instead, they are ecological, in the sense they are properties of  the 
environment relative to the animal.”39 This very claim suggests that Gibson 
himself  did not quite fully overcome the bifurcation of  nature40 that the 
classical categorization of  qualitative properties presupposes. That is, to 
overcome the subject-object divide is to overcome the division between 
primary and secondary qualities—those physical properties that belong to 
things are not ontologically different from the experience of  those things. 
In order for affordances to fulfill their role as the interdependent tissue 
between animal and environment, the properties relative to the animal 
cannot be primary or secondary in importance. It would seem then that if  
one cannot admit the divisions of  primary or secondary properties, one 
certainly cannot admit the category of  a third—or tertiary qualities. 
 I would interpret Gibson’s imprecision on the categorization 
of  properties as evidence of  his commitment to the concreteness of  
affordances. He wanted to preserve the open character of  affordances, 
while retaining their physicality, declaring there is no such thing as an 
“abstract object.”41 The key criterion that differentiated his affordances 
from Gestalt terms like demand and invitation character was that 
affordances were invariant—what something afforded was immune 
to one’s psychosomatic state. An apple affords edibility, regardless of  
38. Gibson, 1982, 417. 
39. Ibid, 404.
40. For Martin Heidegger the verb attunement was critical to his characterization of  
Mood, Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh New York: SUNY Press, 
1996. 313






































onwhether or not you are hungry or like how it tastes. The apple is colored 
red for complex evolutionary motives—red makes it stand out from the 
background, evokes erotic desire, excites my nervous system—but is the 
color red here an affordance because it makes me want to bite the apple? 
First it would seem that in order for something to qualify as affordance it 
must pass the invariant test. Second, despite its conceptual inconsistency, 
yet respecting Gibson at his word—it cannot be a phenomenal quality—the 
color red, then would seem to fail on both accounts. Which is not to say that 
red does not modulate my mood or elicit my desire, it just means it cannot 
strictly be considered as an affordance. For these reasons, affordances 
cannot properly be applied in the context of  atmospheres, to do so, would 
be to extend Gibson’s radical notion to its breaking point. I would suggest 
that a more fitting verb to use to describe the capacity of  atmospheres 
to do, would be the verb attune,42  as one would tune an instrument, “To 
bring into harmony.” Atmospheres can move us powerfully, pervade us 
with their certain intangible signature, tune us according to their own 
particular harmony or dissonance. For the sake of  my aim here, rather 
than articulating affordances as features of  atmospheres, I suggest that 
in the effort to enrich our vocabulary of  alternatives to the subject-object 
dichotomy it is more helpful to consider atmospheres and affordances 
separately (see Figure 4.2 in Dr. James Hamilton’s essay as a reference).
Performative Affordances                                                                                           
 As opportunities for action, affordances always imply bodily 
coupling, they are shapes in the world that shape the body and vice-versa. 
Performative affordances are designed with a specific purpose, to evoke 
a prescribed response. This does not mean that the affordance will not 
perform other unforeseen gestures and responses, but that it is configured 
according to a very specific purpose. An outstanding example of  an 
umwelt with nested performative affordances that work in concert in a 
dynamic system is Alvar Aalto’s Paimio Sanatorium—this is a rare example 
of  a building that was intended to do, rather than being an assemblage of  
“esthetically pleasing forms,” yet whose outcome is exceedingly pleasing. 
The building was designed for patients recovering from tuberculosis, and 
was informed by Aalto’s own personal experience. When Aalto himself  
was hospitalized, he realized that hospitals are rarely designed from the 
patient’s point of  view, who is almost always lying down. Instead at 
42. For Martin Heidegger the verb attunement was critical to his characterization of  
Mood, Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh New York: SUNY Press, 
1996. 313. 43 Goran Schildt, Alvar Aalto, A Life’s Work--Architecture, Design and Art, Helsin-
ki, Otava Publishing Company, 69.
Paimio, “The room design is determined by the depleted strength of  the 
patient reclining in his bed. The color of  the ceiling is chosen for its quiet, 
the light sources are outside the patient’s field of  vision, the heating is 
oriented towards the patient’s feet and the water runs soundlessly from the 
taps to make sure that no patient disturbs his neighbor.”43 Windows and 
the placement of  beds were based on solar considerations and daylighting, 
balconies were colorful and located to optimize resting in the sunshine. He 
designed communal spaces for interaction, and mutual resting in the sun. 
He and his wife Aino carefully designed the furniture, fixtures and door 
hardware to afford comfort and aesthetic delight. Because the rooms were 
intended to be shared by two people, sinks were designed to be noiseless 
so as not to disturb one’s fellow patient, handles were designed to be 
easily and silently opened. The iconic Paimio armchair’s sensuous curves 
were not designed purely for visual delight, but were shaped according to 
the patient’s spine to facilitate easier breathing. Aalto acknowledged the 
precedent in Marcel Breuer’s Wassily chair (Figure 2.8), but intentionally 
used wood instead of  metal because metal conducts heat away from the 
body. For this reason, the handrails on the stairs are made of  wood, a 
material that is porous, because it once too breathed. Being porous, it is 
more responsive to the ambient environment. We tend to see this chair in 
isolation, as an object, but in their original context, the chairs they were 





































onarrayed in a communal room, situated in a sun-lit ensemble. Every detail, 
the affordances of  handles, faucets, sinks, windows, the handrails, the 
symphony of  chairs in the communal rooms of  the patients’ umwelt was 
considered with attention to their healing process. Aalto explicitly stated 
that his aim for the building to function as a “medical instrument.”44  And 
I don’t think he intended instrument in the mechanistic sense, but rather 
in the sense of  a musical instrument, one that in concert with the human 
breath and movement is animated to make music. The building was an 
umwelt for healing, outfitted and detailed with affordances to invite and 
organize actions, postures and gestures and colored and lit to attune 
person and place in a total atmosphere of  well-being.                                                           
 “Affordances do not cause behavior but constrain and afford 
it.”45 insisted Gibson, and while he was clear that affordances do not 
cause behavior, in the case of  performative affordances they can limit the 
alternative actions to the extent that they intentionally shape, and therefore 
to a large extent favor certain behaviors over other possible alternatives. 
Aalto’s medical instrument, like a musical instrument, was designed in a way 
to elicit certain sounds and not others, and yet it allowed each player, to mark 
the performance with their own personality. Another classic example of  a 
performative affordance is the layout of  the British House of  Commons 
Chamber, whose destruction provoked Winston Churchill’s memorable 
statement, “We shape our buildings and thereafter, they shape us.” After 
years of  experience working in the parliament chamber he came to deeply 
appreciate how the rectangular chamber forced the adversarial parties to 
face one another, unlike the semi-circular or horseshoe configurations 
commonly used by other governments. When it came time to rebuild the 
chamber, they retained not only the configuration, but also its relatively 
small size with only 427 seats to accommodate 646 ministers—so that 
they could maintain the intimacy and liveliness of  their debates. Another 
example comes from South Pacific islanders whose leaders meet in a room 
with ceilings so low that one cannot stand up inside of  them. When people 
are angry they stand up and wave their fists, and the low-ceiling prevents 
this from happening. The ceiling height constrains behavior so that the 
leaders are more likely to resolve disagreements peacefully. Given what we 
now know about the correlation between gesture and endochrine levels, 
the dominant pose of  standing up likely releases testosterone and perhaps 
exacerbates aggression levels. 
Generative Affordances
 Affordances can be performative but not deterministic, and when 
they are more loosely composed and open-ended, rather than suggest 
certain behaviors, their very openness can favor improvisation—I call 
these generative affordances, because they generate unforeseen responses. 
If  the musical instrument was the analogy for a performative affordance, 
designed to allow certain sounds yet flexible enough for them to be played 
in different ways, the analogy for generative affordances is the surfboard. 
The surfboard affords surfing, it is true, but it has also generated many 
other sports and subcultures to go along with them. The non-specificity 
of  the shape affords a certain flow. The film, Dogtown and the Z Boys 
documents how on days when the waves were not big enough to surf, 
surfers attached wheels to what was essentially a miniature surfboard and 
rode around Los Angeles, eventually improvising skateboards to cruise 
around inside empty swimming pools. This of  course is the origin of  
skateboarding, and even today, skateboard parks are designed with the 
features that emulate the old lima bean shaped swimming pools with 
44. Ibid
45. Gibson, 1982, 415.
concrete rims that populated Los Angeles in the 1970’s. Skateboarding 
translated to snow became snowboarding. You could trace all of  these 
developments back to the open and flowing shape of  the board.
 The evolution of  board sports has changed the topography of  
our cities—where one sees a bench, another sees a curvature that could 
generate a possible trick. The tool of  the board has opened a different way 
Figure 2.9: Skateboarder engages his environment in downtown 






































46. Gibson lived from 1904-1979 and Aldo Van Eyck from 1918 to 1999. 
47. As quoted in Robert MCarter, Aldo Van Eyck, New Haven, Yale, 118..
of  perceiving the environment through the many possible movements it 
affords; and those flowing movements seem to seek out contours that will 
allow that particular gesture (Figure 2.9). Each topos—the Greek word for 
place—suggests movements that go along with it; and, understood in this 
way—forms form. It is not just that skateboards move some ways and not 
others that causes the skateboarder to favor certain shapes and contours 
over others—skateboarding has generated its own subculture—a network 
of  postures, gestures, linguistic expressions, clothing and attitudes in 
rhythm with the flowing movements afforded by the skateboard. Board 
sports require loose-fitting clothing that accommodate the movements, 
the general outlook is open, experimental and anti-authoritarian and 
the role of  performance is more akin to dance as an artistic expression 
and spectacle, than it is to other athletic performances. The tool of  the 
skateboard generates behavior as well as a culture and local topography 
that supports that behavior. This is yet another illustration that, “We feel 
because we do,” or we feel because of  how we move, that is, our affective 
dispositions are calibrated by our movements, actions and gestures and 
those dispositions in turn trigger a cascade of  further consequences and 
this spectrum of  activity is an untapped dimension of  design. What and 
how we design impacts the way we move, think and feel.                           
 To design things for the sake of  the movements, actions and 
gestures they will afford, not for how they look—but for what they do, 
which is essentially Gibson’s advice for architects resonates uncannily with 
the work of  Aldo Van Eyck who worked at roughly the same time.46 Like 
Gibson’s rejection of  Euclidean form for its own sake and insistence on 
design as the layout of  surfaces—Van Eyck was concerned not so much 
with what things look like, but with what things do. Architecture was not 
a search for ideal forms, but a configurative discipline whose task was to, 
“Get closer to the center of  human reality and build its counterform.” 
Van Eyck’s47 notion of  a counterform illustrates the interactive formative 
dialogue between the shapes of  things and the way those things shape us. 
According to Van Eyck, design elements should be configured to support 
the shapes and rituals of  everyday life: “A wall, a seat or some steps on 
which to repose, talk, wait or watch; a table around which people gather 
for an occasion; a balustrade, wall or lamppost against which one can 
lean and smoke a pipe, a door that allows one to tarry with dignity. All 
these things are not spaces as such but they constitute place in the most 
physical sense.”48 And like Gibson’s understanding of  space as place and 
time as event, Van Eyck memorably said, “Space has no room and time 
has not a moment for man . . . Whatever space and time mean, place and 
occasion mean more. For space in the image of  man is place, and time in 
the image of  man is occasion.”49 Both Gibson and VanEyck understood 
the power of  design to shape everyday life, to structure movements and 
even to modulate thought and feeling. Design had its most potent effect 
not so much in grand schemes as it did in the intimate topography of  
ordinary gestures and movements. “Large structures (infrastructures) 
must not only be comprehensible in their own right, they must above 
all—this is the crucial point—assist the overall comprehensibility of  the 
minutely configured intimate fabric which constitutes the immediate 
counterform of  each and every citizen’s everyday life . . . Each citizen 
would thus ‘inhabit’ the entire city in space and time.”50 Van Eyck’s notion 
of  the counterform illustrates my point about how skateboarders seek out 
shapes and contours in the urban fabric that support their movements; 
one’s actions, gestures and movements seek out a physical support—a 
counterform—and a place that includes and welcomes those movements 
is a place one can truly inhabit, one that is affirming, a place in which one 
feels like they belong.
 The architect’s task, according to Van Eyck was to “provide the 
urban ‘interiors’ society needs; the built counterform of  its dwindling 
identity.”51 And some of  his most important built work that embodies this 
philosophy are the hundreds of  playgrounds that Aldo Van Eyck designed 
around Amsterdam after the Second World War. These playgrounds 
reinvigorated the empty pockets and sites of  demolished buildings, and he 
intended for them to, “To become part of  the city’s everyday fabric . . . to 
respond to the child’s elementary inclinations and movements and activate 
his imagination.”52 The playgrounds would accomplish this because they 
were, “Conceived of  these simple vital things—only then will imaginative 
non-abstract constructions and forms be evolved. As long as attention is 
directed not to aesthetic effects, but to experience value, archetypal ideas 
valid for different parts of  the world in varied form will soon ensue.”53 
The playgrounds are configurations of  simple structures that are open-
ended, in the sense that they invite multiple ways to respond and play 
with them, the benches are arranged judiciously so that caretakers could 










































onkeep an eye on the children without encroaching on their activities and 
they succeeded in becoming part of  the urban fabric because they are not 
fenced in.
 These playgrounds are outstanding architectural examples of  
generative affordances, and the great deal of  analysis54 (Figure 2.10 and 
2.11) that they have since received can help us understand why they have 
worked so well and are so beloved. The playground equipment was non-
54. Rob Withagen & Simone R. Caljouw. Aldo Van Eyck’s Playgrounds: Aesthetics, Affor-
dances and Creativity in Frontiers in Psychology. July 2017, volume 8. 
extraneous in order to create “vital things.” Taking to heart his friend’s 
words, “Simplicity is not a goal in art but one reaches simplicity in spite of  
oneself, by approaching the real sense of  things.”55 Always dimensioned 
according to the mutating shape of  childrens’ bodies, Van Eyck’s play 
structures consisted of  repeated elements: sandpits nested within low 
walls of  varying shapes, steel tubes bent into arches, domes and cones and 
stepping stones of  differing shapes and heights. “What is perhaps most 
striking about Van Eyck’s playgrounds,” as Robert McCarter has noted, 
“is that each one is an entirely unique design for a specific site; each one 
turns often seemingly irresolvable existing conditions to advantage; each 
one uses the same limited set of  common elements; each one is clearly 
part of  a family of  forms—and yet the particular arrangement of  each 
design is never repeated.”56 Like musical compositions and performances, 
the playgrounds configured repeating elements in relationship to factors 
unique to their situation, their vitality was generated in the relation between 
the elements, the pause between the notes.
 This attention to the configuration of  solid elements in terms of  
the dynamics of  the relationship generated between them comes forward 
most powerfully in the fact that none of  the playgrounds were fenced 
in. At the time, playgrounds were cordoned off  and patrolled to insure 
the safety of  the children. Van Eyck was able to create the sense of  a 
protected, magical world without such rigid enforcement. Rather than 
playgrounds per se, they more closely resembled furniture arrangements, 
with toys for kids and benches for grown-ups. And this is exactly how they 
functioned, the lack of  a hard boundary, turned the invisible boundary 
into a sort of  live edge, a porous membrane which contained the young 
and old together, as if  they were inhabiting a protected precinct much 
like a room (Again see Figure 2.11). Certain etiquette developed around 
these nodes of  activity, a shared code of  conduct naturally emerged which 
created its own protected circle of  behavior. The playground equipment 
is obviously a generative affordance, but what about the ambiguous edge 
that also generated certain behaviors—is that an affordance, too?
 The verb afford is rooted in the word for “to further, forward, 
onward,” which has a definite developmental meaning and when used 
in reference to things means, “to be capable of  yielding,” which speaks 
to the flexibility, elasticity and even generosity inchoate in the term 
affordance. When understood in this light I would say that the ambiguous 
55. As quoted in Van Eyck, The Child, the City and the Artist, 1962/2008. 
56. McCarter, p.43.
Figure 2.10: Before Construction of one 
of Aldo Van Eyck’s Playground. Image 
courtest of an the article “Aldo van 
Eyck and the City as Playground” by 
Merijn Oudenampsen.
Figure 2.11: After construction of one 
of Aldo Van Eyck’s Playground. Image 
courtest of an the article “Aldo van 
Eyck and the City as Playground” by 
Merijn Oudenampsen.
specific, in the sense that it did not suggest a narrow mode of  use. Van 
Eyck was explicitly against “abstract forms” which uncannily echoes 
Gibson’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of  “abstract objects” yet 
his critics have praised this playground equipment for being so abstract. 
Van Eyck was a friend and admirer of  Constantin Brancusi, famous for 
his genius in distilling the emotionally charged act of  something like a 
kiss into a powerful sculptural gesture. And like Brancusi, Van Eyck’s aim 





































onedge of  the playground is a generative affordance, its ambiguity generates 
improvisation, allowing for growth and emergence—the processes of  life. 
The playground design manifests the import of  the Zen master Shunryū 
Suzuki’s saying that, if  you want to keep your cow close to you, give 
her a big pasture.57 Indeed, the absence of  an outward restraint causes 
one to create an inner boundary—the lack of  an outward structure of  
control, causes one to generate one’s own with the tools at hand. Yet, we 
cannot fully appreciate how a generative affordance functions unless we 
understand it in the context of  its role in a larger dynamic system. And 
while this is not the place to launch into a summary of  dynamic systems 
theory, for our purposes it is helpful to improvise some of  their basic 
principles. 
 A dynamic system is self-organizing; its organization and structure 
emerge from diverse elements that interact on multiple levels in nonlinear 
and time-sensitive ways. Dynamic systems have an inherent tendency 
to create pattern. Behavior and development are constructed through 
process according to the organizational principle of  soft-assembly.58 
Understood as dynamic systems, the very openness of  the playgrounds’ 
layout, the relationship between soft (spatial) and hard (solid) elements, 
the non-specificity of  the equipment excited the imagination to invite 
multiple interpretations. The ambiguous boundary itself  generated a living 
protective edge because the system self-organizes and has a tendency to 
create pattern, and in a sense builds a functional fence where no physical 
fence exists. That is, because there is no explicit boundary, caretakers 
have to pay more attention to the children to assure they were weren’t 
wandering too far, rather than becoming overly engrossed in reading their 
newspapers. Without a fence, children can feel free and exercise their own 
sense of  limits. While at the same time, caretakers have to be present in 
the moment—and this presence, this awareness could be considered as an 
integral component of  the system itself. In this way, the configuration of  
objects was a pattern that patterned attention and awareness. The principle 
of  soft-assembly describes the way development happens through the 
multimodal and spontaneous appropriation of  the tools at hand; these 
tools can be “hard” as in playground equipment, or they can be “soft” 
the way that human awareness is soft but no less real or relevant to the 
way actions, movements or places and events are organized and come 
into being. Soft-assembly describes how development is constructed 
57. Shunryu Suzuki. Zen Mind Beginner’s Mind. New York, Weatherhill, 1970, 14. 
58. Ibid
through process, how children learn to become self-regulating when given 
the opportunity to exercise their limits and receive feedback from their 
environment. Yet this can only happen when they have been given “a large 
pasture” as the Zen saying goes. As Suzuki says, “Even though you try to 
put people under control, it is impossible. You cannot do it. The best way 
to control people is to encourage them to be mischievous. Then they will 
be in control in a wider sense. To give your sheep or cow a large spacious 
meadow is the way to control him. So it is with people: first let them 
do what they want, and watch them. This is the best policy. To ignore 
them is not good. That is the worst policy. The second worst is trying to 
control them. The best one is to watch them, just to watch them, without 
trying to control them.”59 Here Suzuki summarizes the elusive, yet very 
real potential of  generative affordances.
 Affordances is a general term, as well as a generous and 
generative one, and articulating different ways that affordances function 
is not intended to be a pedantic exercise, but rather to stimulate thinking 
about the endless ways to engage our bodies and minds in the ecology 
of  our daily lives. Articulating affordances can take us from abstractions 
to actions, from general behavior to specific gestures and can open more 
sensitive levels of  awareness. When we architects interpret our brief  in 
terms not of  forms, but of  potential movements and become aware of  
how those movements shape mood, attitude, disposition, memory and 
imagination, we engage the soft dimension of  human consciousness into 
our configurative discipline. Details will speak not only to the trained eye 
of  our peers, but to the contours and sound of  the human hand, the 
curvature of  the spine that affords breathing, the shape of  the basin that 
diverts a splash into a cascade, and the rhythm of  rocking that animates 
the soul of  the porch. The circle of  play and the bench that makes a 
place, the circle of  light illumined by the candle that makes an occasion, 
the attention paid to these specifics has been the missing link in the 
education of  an architect concerned with the top down approach that fails 
to consider and support the rituals of  daily life in pursuit of  the abstract 
ideal. In the words of  Aldo Van Eyck, “Whoever attempts to solve the 
riddle of  space in the abstract will construct the outline of  emptiness and 
call it space. Whoever attempts to meet humanity in the abstract will speak 
with an echo and call this dialogue. Humans still breathe in and out. When 
is architecture going to do the same?60
59. Ibid 
60.Aldo Van Eyck, Aldo Van Eyck Writings, vol. 1- The Child, the City and the Artist, 






























veJust What Can Architects Afford?
Harry Francis Mallgrave
39
 Although the theme of  this talk is the idea of  affordance within 
the humanities today, I would like first to consider the idea in an economic 
sense. Designers have limited time and money to put into the conception 
and realization of  a building, and the question I would like to pose is on 
what exactly should they spend this time? What is the role of  the architect 
in designing, documenting, and overseeing the project? A score of  talented 
engineers can now provide nearly all of  the technical specifications that 
go into a design, and a team of  good contractors are capable of  building 
almost any creation or aberration that the architect may concoct. So, what 
role does the architect play? 
 Some may argue that designers come up with the overarching 
“idea” of  the design—that is, they provide the framework or what is 
sometimes referred to as the “aesthetic” expression of  the building’s 
functions. Yet this view rings somewhat hollow to me, because it leaves 
out many other things. It seems to reduce the designer’s role—if  I might 
borrow the binary option of  the late Robert Venturi—to designing the 
wallpaper for the decorated shed, or sculpting the feathered locks of  
the duck. Wherein resides this so-called aesthetic idea, in any case? Even 
philosophers as deliberate as Immanuel Kant, as we shall see, were unable 
to find it. A little more than sixty years ago the great Finnish architect Alvar 
Aalto, in a lecture entitled “The Architect’s Dream of  Paradise,” offered 
what I think is a more gallant and noble response to the question of  the 
designer’s role, when he noted that “Every building, every architectural 
product that is its symbol, is intended to show that we wish to build a 
paradise on earth for man.”
 Now these are high aspirations, because the notion of  paradise is 
fecund with both lush images and historical meanings. The lost or future 
paradise stands at the core of  the Hindu, Buddhist, Judeo-Christian, and 
Islamic religions. The Greek word paradeisos, which appears twice in the 
Alexandrian translation of  the Hebrew bible, comes from the Persian 
word paridaeza, which mean an enclosed or walled-off  garden. Thus, the 
word paradise is most generally associated with the garden.
 This is also true with the great rulers of  the ancient world. The 
famed Hanging Gardens of  Babylon, as we now know, were actually 
located in the Assyrian city of  Nineveh (present-day Mosul), and King 
Àshurbanipal went to great lengths to describe not his palace but the gardens 
that he had designed. The great imperial cities of  China were built around 
1. Sinclair Gauldie, Architecture: The Appreciation of  the Arts (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), p. 182.
Figure 3.0: Giulio Romano, 1499–1546, Italian painter and architect, Fresco on 
the south wall of  Palazzo del Tè. (Public Domain)
To live in an environment which has to be endured or ignored 
rather than enjoyed is to be diminished as a human being.1






























vethe emperor’s palace, which was generally centered within or adjacent to 
the imperial garden. The city of  Kyoto, the one-time capital of  Japan, 
exists today as a city defined almost entirely by its imperial and monastic 
gardens. Plato and Epicurus gave their lectures in gardens. Hadrian built 
his imperial city at Tivoli (for a resident of  one) in a vast garden. And the 
mesmerizing mosaic depiction of  the wide-eyed Empress Theodora in 
the church of  San Vitale in Ravenna is portrayed inside a garden pavilion. 
Early Christian monks who left their towns for the isolation of  desert 
caves or forest huts alluded to them as paradises. Later in the Middle Ages, 
the reform-minded Cistercians referred to the cloisters of  their austere 
stone abbeys as paradises. Imagine for a moment how indeed paradisiacal 
were their churches with their extremely high reverberation times, the aural 
spectacle of  one hundred monks in a candle-lit midnight mass interlacing 
the precisely times phrases of  their Gregorian chants (Figure 3.1). They 
must have imagined the collective sound as emanating from heaven above. 
 Does this mean that Aalto was misguided in his hope that 
designers could build another paradise?2 Or have we, as designers, lost our 
way in the muddy philosophical backwaters of  semiotics, postmodernism, 
poststructuralism, deconstruction, and computer-generated software—all 
of  which at least has had the benefit of  wringing the last molecule of  
life out of  a tedious and exhausting line of  architectural theory. Like the 
Sirens of  the Odyssey, theory has lured architects into the belief  that the 
purpose of  design is to play conceptual games or be edgy, as it were, 
through the manipulation of  society’s cultural emblems. In doing so, we 
have overlooked the fact that architecture is predominantly a “whole body” 
experience—a multisensory, emotional, hormonal, and phenomenal one 
grounded in the entire bodily organism. This experience also arises in the 
dynamic interplay of  the ecological, social, and cognitive environments. If  
design studios have emphasized the need to be creative in a fashionable 
display of  glass boxes or twisted cutting-edge objects, Aalto’s notion of  
paradise was much simpler. He was simply voicing the desire to create an 
environment in which people would thrive and be happy.
II.
 Yet how do we save our ship from being pummeled on the rocks 
of  our own unchallenged design premises? The problem is not an easy one 
because of  the great complexities of  what we now refer to as global culture. 
But perhaps we should start by admitting that we have, in recent years, 
been a little intellectual lazy. After theory crashed and burned sometime 
around the start of  the new millennium, we have been coasting along a 
little too smugly. We continue to view the world in Cartesian dualities, 
such as the belief  that we have material bodies into which are crammed 
the gray matter of  thinking minds, or that we are subjects cast within an 
objective world somehow standing apart from us, something that we can 
manipulate at will. We continue to characterize culture as something out 
there in the world, something given and not of  our making, something 
over which we have little or no control. We continue to ignore the fact that 
in the last quarter-century philosophy, the humanities more broadly, and 
the biological sciences have undergone a significant paradigm shift—to 
borrow a phrase from Thomas Kuhn. It is one that has uprooted many 
centuries-old ways of  viewing the world. If  we wish to start fresh in our 
pursuit of  Aalto’s paradise, then perhaps the first thing that we do is to 
work with an up-to-date understanding of  who we are as living organisms. 
Figure 3.1: Abbaye du Thoronet in Abbey in Le Thoronet, France, 1157. (Public Domain)
2. Alvar Aalto, The Architect’s Dream of  Paradise, (1957), in Göran Schildt, Alvar Aalto in His 






























veIn part, this new view of  ourselves can be summarized by this passage of  
the philosophers Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela:
 There are two crucial points for architects that can be extracted 
from this summation. First, we cannot extract the organism from the 
environment in which it is embedded; our very existence is bound with 
it. Second, because architects build environments, they contribute largely 
to the environmental and social cultures in which our lives unfold. A little 
over a year ago, a group of  European architects and planners at the annual 
gathering of  world leaders in Davos, Switzerland, issued the proclamation 
that we urgently needed a holistic, culture-centered approach to the built 
environment. What does such an approach entail? We might start with the 
underlying premise of  the new biological field of  niche construction—
that is, when an organism alters its environmental field, it also changes the 
natural-selection pressures of  that organism. Saying it another way, every 
time we pollute the environmental field with poor objects of  our own 
design, we demean ourselves as a species. 
 Three interrelated terms stand in the forefront of  the contemporary 
humanistic discourse: embodiment, enculturation, and enactivism. To say 
that we are embodied organisms by virtue of  our bodies borders on a 
tautology, yet from a cognitive perspective it is important to clarify one 
essential point. Cognition in itself  does not exist in the brain somewhere 
alone or apart from the body. Every thought, every course of  action, every 
meaningful affordance is a function of  the whole organism. If  you at 
semester’s end have not slept for three days, your life is diminished and your 
compacity for thinking is lessened. Thought is therefore limited, or rather 
defined, by the capacities of  our bodies. We view the world surrounding us 
with human eyes, human ears, human olfaction, human tactile sensibilities, 
and human spatial awareness, which differ from the same capacities of  
other organisms. A bat or a bee, for example does not see what we see. We 
do not function in the same spectrum of  light or sound, or in any other 
3. Evan Thompson and Francsico Varela, “Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and 
consciousness,” Trends in Cognitive Science, 5:10 (October 201), pp. 423-424.
sensory regard. Our social lives are also unique. As one textbook on the 
idea of  embodiment made the case: “By using the term embodiment we 
might highlight two points: first that cognition depends upon the kinds 
of  experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor 
capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are 
themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological 
and cultural context.”3 If  a bee with its sensory system seeks out honey, 
we have our own perceptual and organic affectations. 
 The idea of  enculturation or culture is another term whose meaning 
has radically shifted in recent years. According to the anthropological 
models of  the 1960s, culture was simply the “nurture” factor of  the nature/
nurture equation—that is, culture was something imposed upon the human 
genetic structure from the outside, from the social environment that 
humans themselves have created. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz in 
the early 1970s, for instance, defined culture as “extragenetic, outside-the-
skin” control mechanisms, which distinguish the behavior of  our species 
from other species.4 Contemporary philosophy, however, views culture in 
a very different light, as we have seen with Thompson’s characterization 
of  the brain, body, and environment as dynamically structured systems 
mutually embedded. The original meaning of  the word “culture,” taking 
it back to its Latin root, is growing or cultivating something in the soil 
or a prepared medium. The humanities and sciences are today actually 
returning us to this meaning. In architectural terms, culture is tending 
to the human organism within its built and social environments—the 
inseparable environmental and cultural medium in which our particular 
organism either thrives or diminishes.
 The idea of  culture is also related to that of  enactivism, which 
is the idea that we are not bodies separate from and cognitively assessing 
an objective world apart from us. Rather, there is a dynamic interplay 
between the two, which cannot be suspended. Our constantly changing 
cognitive systems, through each individual and generational change, enacts 
or constructs the meaning of  what we perceive. Each of  us, living in a 
cultural medium, enacts a somewhat different world. And our different 
experiences, in turn, are a result of  the mutual interaction between our 
sensorimotor capacities and the environment in which we dwell.
4. Francisco Varela et al., The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), p. 172-73.
5. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of  Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 
1973), p. 44.
The nervous system, the body and the environment are highly 
structured dynamical systems, coupled to each other on multiple 
levels.  Because they are so thoroughly enmeshed—biologically, 
ecologically and socially—a better conception of  brain, body, and 
environment would be as mutually embedded systems rather than 































 And here we come to the idea of  “affordance,” the theme of  
this particular seminar. In 1934, the biologist Jakob first approached 
the idea with his notion of  the Umwelt, the surrounding world, or how 
our perception is defined by the sensory carriers of  meaning particular 
to our organism.6 In 1979 the psychologist James Gibson carried this 
notion forward when he defined a “niche”—that which we as architects 
are presumed to design—as “a set of  affordances.” He also noted that a 
“niche” stands apart from the idea of  “habitat, because it refers more to 
how an animal lives than to where it lives.”7 
 I will make the case that this distinction between “how we live,” 
as opposed to “where we live,” is crucial to a more responsible approach 
to design. It is pivotal because it suggests that we should be focusing less 
on what a building means to the occupant or to the designer (for the latter, 
usually a reaffirmation of  the latest fashions), and more on how people 
experience them. Take these two somewhat random images. 
 One is the almost prototypical American urban street: little direct 
sunlight within the canyons of  the tall buildings, concrete sidewalks, glass 
boxes with no detailing—in short, a cold, boring, and lifeless design offering 
no sensory spark or engagement. Various studies have shown that people 
pick up their pace when walking past such buildings, in order to move away 
from them as quickly as possible (Figure 3.2). Unfortunately, the glass box 
adjacent to it typically provides only more of  the same. The American 
anthropologist Edward T. Hall, back in the 1960s, made the observation 
that the failing of  modern architecture was precisely its lack of  scale 
and tactile stimulation. As he described the problem: “Our urban spaces 
provide little excitement or visual variation and virtually no opportunity 
to build a kinesthetic repertoire of  spatial experiences. It would appear 
that many people are kinesthetically deprived and even cramped.”8 This 
statement was made fifty-three years ago, and yet we seem content with 
making the same mistake. Perhaps an even more embarrassing question is 
why are we content with designing with the architectural palette of  a half-
century ago? 
6. Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of  Animals and Humans, trans. Joseph D. 
O’Neil (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 2010).
7. James Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1986), p. 128.
8. Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1966), 
p. 59.
 The other image, admittedly situated in a better climate, has, by 
contrast, sunlight, greenery (so important in relaxing the optic nerve), 
texture, scale, history, and of  the affordance of  multiple transportations, 
which allows us the healthy exercising of  our biological organism (Figure 
3.3). Why is it that architects, and even those studying architecture I dare 
say, still tend to gravitate toward the so-called solution on the left? It is 
because we are focused on the object and not the experience of  the urban 
inhabitant. Designers are looking for a technological solution rather than 
creating a human niche that allows people a set of  affordances.
 We can see this same problem in other ways. Television studios 
across the country are always set up with a view of  their city’s skyline, 
or an image of  it, in the background. People living in cities, for some 
odd reason, seem to take pride in their city’s skyline. This was in part the 
thinking behind the decision of  London politicians, just a few decades 
ago, when they decided to allow high rises within the downtown areas—
much to the chagrin of  Prince Albert and Christopher Wren. And note, 
incidentally, the absence of  trees in those newly renovated zones. This is 
an image that appeared in the English journal Reaction, which carried the 
headline “Why are London’s skyscrapers so ugly?” Thinking of  a city from 
the perspective of  a helicopter, London politicians and planners wanted to 
have their city be seen as an international hub of  commerce and banking. 
And here we have all of  architecture’s elite designers participating. Yet at 
the same time, there is a price to pay for this preening exercise, which is 
the destruction of  much of  the city’s historic scale and stately fabric, nodal 
Figure 3.2: Glass building in city context
http://www.soboxdebanheiro.com.br/
vidros-refletivos
Figure 3.3: Stanford University’s masonry 
































vepoints of  high congestion, and shadowed streets on which many people 
walk past these glass boxes in a very unhappy frame of  mind. Parisians, 
living within a different cultural niche, interestingly still restrict their high 
rises to the outskirts of  the city. 
 I once lived in Chicago, and from the 35th street station on the 
Red Line, one can look north to the impressive skyline of  Chicago. People 
commuting into the city on freeways from the west also view the skyline as 
they are arriving, no doubt with some pride or sense of  self-importance. 
Yet over many months of  the year, people walking those downtown 
streets do so with little joy. The cardinal grid channels the howling winter 
winds into the glass-and-concrete canyons at great intensity. Trash litters 
the sidewalks. The ambient noise level of  the overhead mass-transit 
system and the horns of  the automobiles are only slightly less disturbing 
than standing at the end of  a runway at O’Hare Airport. The air is fowl, 
and the tens of  thousands of  commuters emerging from their parking 
garages or bleak subway stations, twice a day, have to endure this hellish 
experience of  walking to or from their offices--where, if  their desk is 
less than twenty feet from the window walls, they will shiver away their 
body heat all day long. I think my point is now rather obvious. Architects 
radiate a distinct glow when asked by fawning critics to expound upon the 
inspiration behind their glass towers, aesthetically fashioned with the latest 
twists and bends. Yet the experience of  the residents negotiating the city 
on a daily basis is more often than not a hellish one—even if  their iPhones 
can direct them to the nearest pub or pizza parlor. How did we come to 
this present state of  affairs? Why do we employ such vacuous standards in 
our designs? There is a line from a Clint Eastwood movie that pretty much 
explains it: “We became civilized.” The legacy of  these dumb glass boxes 
plopped in every city across the globe will nevertheless remain with us for 
quite a while. Whatever happened to Aalto’s dream of  paradise?
IV.
Just what can designers afford? Andy Clark defines affordance this way: 
“Affordances are the possibilities for use, intervention and action which 
the physical world offers a given agent and are determined by the ‘fit’ 
between the agent’s physical structure, capacities and skills and the action-
related properties of  the environment itself.”9 I like in particular the idea of  
a “fit” between the human organism and “action-related” qualities of  the 
9. Andy Clark, “An embodied cognitive science,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3:9 (September 
1999), p. 346.
environment. And because one perceives the built environment through 
one’s sensory and emotional engagement with it, the architect’s task would 
seem to be creating environments that are intriguing or compelling in some 
manner, environments that are adaptive to our organisms, environments 
that are restorative or restive, or more simply, environments that make 
us happy. Conversely, people shun environments that are dangerous, 
annoying, tedious, and injurious to their health.
 Yet because we, as a society, seem unable to repair the impoverished 
or dilapidated parts of  our cities, or maintain our dark and filthy mass-
transit stations where we are jammed into overcrowded trains, or relieve 
our suburban commuters of  their two hours of  bumper-to-bumper travel 
on so-called expressways—we run up against the difficult question of  
what can architects really afford? Can we really think of  changing the 
patterns that have been set down over generations, as it were? Can we any 
longer contemplate, as Aalto once did, a vision of  something different? In 
what way can we realistically provide a better “fit” or attunement of  the 
human organism with the action-related prospects of  its surroundings?
 Although there may be no timely or inexpensive solutions to 
the many failings of  our present environments, we can at least start by 
reforming our profession, and in this regard, I would like to begin with a 
radical reform of  architectural education. For a start, I would like to see 
significantly less studio time devoted to coming up with the “idea” for a 
design, or how we might ape the latest trends in our glass boxes, and more 
on research into the human experience of  designed environments—that 
is, serious research funded by federal agencies such as the National Science 
Foundation or National Institute of  Health, or private foundations. It 
should be research carried out with the very sophisticated technologies 
we have at our disposal today to evaluate better how we engage with our 
environments. In the 1960s the Green Movement first articulated our 
shortcomings with regard to the impact our poor designs were having on 
our natural environments. Today it is time to address the equally pernicious 
effects our designed environments are having on us—how we think and 
how we socially engage with each other. Some may argue that this time 
spent on research will lessen our skill as designers and thwart creativity, 
yet I believe the opposite to be the case. Architecture students are very 
smart and can handle both tasks, and school is a time for learning and 






























veUnderstanding better who we are and our intensely social natures will 
open up fresh and creative approaches to the design of  our cultural 
niches. Moreover, without such documentation, architects will never have 
credibility with zoning boards, planning commissions, or the heavy arm of  
the ever-expanding and oppressive political state. We should reinforce the 
point that our ultimate objective is good design, or even better, beautiful 
design. And in considering design from a human perspective, we will put 
an end to the intellectual fashions that seem perpetually to plague the field 
of  design.
 Now what kinds of  research do I mean? The range can be quite 
extensive but let me give you a couple of  examples. You are a mostly 
young audience, who have not entered into the tedium of  the workforce, 
and therefore you have not yet been forced to come to terms with the 
idea of  a precious two or three-week vacation each year, where people 
go fishing, rent a cabin in the mountains, visit a foreign country, or stay 
at a seashore resort. Now why do people feel the need to do such things? 
We of  course have the appropriate technological metaphor for needing 
such a thing; we say we do so to recharge our batteries. We mean by this 
that we need periodically a place to relax, to relieve our anxieties and 
tensions, to take in new sensory stimulation, and forget the fact that we 
are nine thousand dollars in debt on our credit cards. Yet we are also 
saying something else when we take on these annual treks. We are saying 
that beaches, golf  courses, mountains, or a trip to a foreign country are in 
their own way paradises, which are remote from our everyday designed or 
built environments. The more dismal our local urban environments are, 
the more these trips are necessary to maintain biological equilibrium and 
good health.
 Yet these trips also tell us something else, which can inform our 
everyday environments. A few decades ago the psychologist Roger Ulrich 
looked at the recovery rates of  patients after a surgical procedure that 
on average required six days in the hospital. He looked at patients in a 
hospital wing that had two different outside views. One part of  the wing 
faced a brick wall; the other part of  the wing opened onto a green meadow. 
He discovered that the view of  nature, in and of  itself, has a restorative 
effect on the human body. Those patients with a view of  the meadow 
stayed in the hospital one day less, had few complications after surgery, 
and took fewer pain medications.10 This study not only told us something 
important about ourselves, but, as it turned out, it also had a profound 
effect on the design of  hospitals, which today are being designed and built 
around gardens, which I, following the ancient Persians, will call paradises. 
It also opened a new realm of  design thinking—biophilic design—or the 
integration of  nature into all of  our designs. Think of  this the next time 
you design a building with a view of  a brick wall, or worse, a parking lot.
 We have many other areas in which research is needed today. 
Ulrich’s study of  hospital rooms concerned the homeostatic regulation of  
the body within the built environment, through the medium of  evidence-
based design. Yet with the same techniques we can study the effects of  
poor environments, or what might be called environmental deprivation. 
They are many, well-documented studies of  the negative effects of  
such environments, among them, obesity, disease, depression, stress, 
crime, drug addiction, alcoholism, asocial behavior, psychological and 
personality disorders, and higher rations of  morbidity. We have known 
these problems for years, yet we as a society seem to be incapable of  
improving our poor urban environments—helpless as we seemingly are. 
Conversely, we have done virtually no research on what constitutes good 
or enriched environments, although studies with rats have shown that 
sensory and socially enriched environments can double the size of  brain 
cells and greatly enhances synaptic connectivity. Does this mean that good 
environments can make us smarter?
10. Robert Ulrich, “View through a Window May Influence Recovery from Surgery,” 
Science 224 (April 27, 1984), pp. 420-21.
Figure 3.4: Swiss Farmhouse, the inherent sense of relaxation of a natural environment. 






























ve We also have another way of  thinking how we engage or 
experience the built environment, which revolves around our sensory 
systems. We have proprioceptive, kinesthetic, sensorimotor, and mirror 
systems; emotional, visceral, and hormonal systems; visual, auditory, and 
olfactory systems; and then there is the breakthroughs in how we engage 
with form and space. The discovery of  mirror systems in the 1990s, for 
instance, will in the future have profound implications for the field of  
architectural design. Through a process that has been called embodied 
simulation, mirror systems in the premotor and parietal areas of  the brain, 
for example, allow us to simulate not only the actions and intentions 
of  others but also the physical characteristic of  the environment, such 
as the perception of  form, space, light, scale, color, texture, materials, 
among other features. Where are these topics within your design-studio 
curriculum?
 A third area in which we, over the past few decades, have made 
important progress about ourselves is the recognition of  how profoundly 
we are social animals. Only very few architects, such as Christopher 
Alexander, have wandered into this terrain, and he did so with only 
modest and sometimes questionable social-science models. Today we 
have made major advances into understanding the parts of  the social brain 
allowing us to network with others, the environmental factors imperative 
for the full development of  the social brain, our much longer evolutionary 
history, and the ubiquity of  human rituals, which lie at the foundation of  
our behavior. Once again, I ask the question: Where is this topic within 
your design-studio curriculum?  
 There is far too much here to discuss today, so I will limit myself  
two areas of  interest to architects. One is the role that emotion or mood 
plays in the experience of  a designed environment. The second is the 
seemingly quaint idea of  beauty, which I will obviously not be discussing 
by the standards of  architectural design juries.
VI.
 The idea of  emotion and mood actually has had a lengthy pedigree 
in architectural discussions going back through architectural history—
that is, before the advent of  the modern movement short-circuited it. 
Aestheticians of  the 19th century also seem to have had a good grasp 
of  mood and perception, matched only by what we have learned in 
the past few decades. Both Robert Vischer and Heinrich Wölfflin, for 
instance, argued that the experience of  architecture was emotional and 
physiognomic—a process by which we feel ourselves into and understand 
the world around us. August Schmarsow made precisely the same argument 
with architectural space—that is, spatial perception is not a neutral or 
Euclidean field but something that changes with the position, orientation, 
and affordances of  our bodies.11
 Traditional psychology textbooks of  just a few decades ago 
defined mood or emotion as a response of  an organism a sensory stimulus, 
the way we typically think of  emotions such as love or anger. Present 
models, however, view mood in a much more complex way. For many 
within the field of  affective psychology, mood is defined as an ongoing, 
endogenous kinesthetic activity onto itself, the predisposed movement 
of  an organism within an environmental field. Mood is not something 
that rises up from some mysterious place below; rather, it is a “whole-
organism” event motivating our movements and actions. If  we walk 
into a social environment of  other people, for example, we immediately 
understand the mood of  the room. If  we walk into a boring architectural 
environment, our first impulse is to leave or tune it out.
 Just as the appearance of  a morning sun seems to brighten the 
prospects for our day, or a drizzling rain seems to dampen it, so does 
every architectural environment alter our mood or way of  thinking. Upon 
entering a room in a northern climate, for instance, we might instinctively 
move toward a sunny window, both to enjoy the warming heat of  the 
sun and to rest our eyes if  there is a pleasant view of  paradise outside. 
Again, if  it is spring and the window is open, we might enjoy a whiff  
of  a fragrance emanating from a garden, without being aware that this 
sensory experience in itself  puts us into an amiable state of  mind. Please 
note that inoperable windows do not allow this affordance. Maxime 
Sheets-Johnstone has emphasized that “affective feelings and tactile-
kinesthetic feelings are experientially intertwined.” Mood is already “a 
postural attitude” or “corporeal readiness to act.”12 We might then think 
of  the open window as more than just sunlight or view of  a garden; it is 
an affordance that swells our mood, perhaps with memories. Giovanna 
Colombetti argues that emotion pervades cognition through and through, 
and thus emotion “is integral to both perception and action.”13 
12. Maxime Sheets-Johnstone, “Emotion and Movement: A Beginning Empirical-Phenom-
enological Analysis of  their Relationship,” Journal of  Consciousness Studies, 6:11-12 (1999), 
p. 265.
13. Giovanna Colombetti, The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind (Cam-






























ve Architects can exploit this connection. We can design spaces that 
are permeable, or offering different courses of  action. We can modulate 
these spaces through the play of  light, scale, color, texture, relation, 
materiality, movement, sound, olfaction, and the depth of  layering effect 
upon effect. A long and indirect approach to a building or a narrow path 
into an expansive room—both build a mood of  anticipation or arousal, 
thereby intensifying the hopeful emotion of  delight upon one’s arrival. 
Similarly, beautifully crafted detailing also pleases everyone. Why? Because 
with our mirror systems we emulate the talent or hand-crafted effort that 
went into the ingenious result. 
 Mood also varies with the experience of  atmospheric and 
conceptual effects. For instance, in medieval France there was a 12th-
century movement called Marianism, a Christian fondness for the 
Madonna, which resulted in a bevy of  Gothic churches dedicated to 
“Our Lady” or Notre Dame. Why was this the case? One reason was 
that Christian theology up to this time had been emphasizing the idea of  
the Last Judgment, the possibility of  fiery and eternal damnation. Mary, 
with her head slightly tilted to the right, thus came to be seen a merciful 
intercessor on one’s behalf, someone more empathetic and approachable. 
Thus, this stained-glass window of  Mary in the chancel of  Chartres 
Cathedral, one of  the original windows of  the 12th-century church (later 
rebuilt after the fire of  1194), is a masterpiece of  color and light, because 
it fosters the mood of  hope and salvation. It did so with the demeanor 
of  the Madonna, but also with the seemingly supernatural nature of  light 
filtering through, which was entirely fitting for a building that medieval 
architects viewed as the doorway to paradise, if  not paradise itself. Aalto 
no doubt applauded the efforts of  this master craftsman of  glass.
 Mood can be manifested in many other ways. Hans Scharoum’s 
Berlin Philharmonic Hall, despite its cosmopolitan location, evokes 
the spirit of  a small town’s music festival. Not only does the tent-like 
ceiling project the festive mood of  a special holiday and its provisional 
structure, but the stepped tiers on all sides afford one to experience not 
only the orchestra and its powerful auditory vibrations but also the view 
of  another’s response to what you are experiencing. Scharoum’s building 
is thus intensely social in its mood. 
 Not all emotional experiences, however, have to be so intense 
or expressive. Jørn Utzon’s own house in Mallorca achieves its emotional 
power or through its utmost simplicity: the social anticipation of  
conversational seating, exposed stonework, and a sublime Mediterranean 
view exploited with a deep perspectival frame (Figure 3.5). Robert Adam 
was another master of  mood, someone who could dramatically alter one’s 
mood from one room to another. Can one think of  a more compelling 
artistic production than his library at Kenwood, Hamptead, London.
 Another master of  mood was Henri Labrouste in this design 
for the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, now unfortunately retired for 
its original purpose. Once again, a festive mood was exploited with the 
books, the paradisiacal gardens depicted in the murals, and the porcelain 
umbrellas filtering natural light for reading. Not to be overlooked in this 
regard was the tactile sensation of  the infill panels of  the desktops—
glare-free and a soft, perfectly muted surfaces for the requisite lead writing 
instrument. What could be more paradisiacal for the work of  the scholar. 
Architects of  the 18th and 19th century knew how to exploit mood in 
subtle ways that many designers have since forgotten. The library at Mount 
Angel Abbey in Oregon, is approached from a courtyard paradise on the 
entrance side, but the reading room is situated on a hilltop to survey an 
agricultural landscape interrupted by treescapes along rivers and streams. 
Aalto, it seems, viewed buildings as experiences.
































 Let us turn to the idea of  beauty, and in an unconventional 
way. Architects typically do not like to speak of  beauty, yet they do talk, 
sometimes endlessly, about the aesthetic inspiration underlying their 
designs. And in this regard, we already have a level of  corruption creeping 
into practice. The English word aesthetic comes from the Greek word 
Aisthētikos, which has the meaning of  “perception, feeling, or sensible 
cognition.” In this regard, its meaning is grounded not in reflection or 
judgment but in the sensory or corporeal senses. Alexander Baumgarten, 
who first plucked the word from the past and introduced it into the 
German language in the 1750s, understood this very well. He emphasized 
its emotional coloration by defining aesthetics as the “science of  sensible 
cognition.”14 
 Problems became apparent a few years later, however, when a host 
of  philosophers debated whether the judgment of  beauty was objective 
or subjective, whether it resided in the outlines or contours of  the artistic 
form, or in the mind of  the viewing subject. In almost all cases, the idea of  
beauty was bound with the idea of  making a judgment. Immanuel Kant, 
in his Critique of  Judgment, considered the issue of  beauty and went to great 
lengths to preclude the idea of  “feeling” or “emotion” from the act of  
judgment. At one point, as we suggested earlier, he even proffered the 
ghostly notion of  “aesthetic ideas”—that is, conceptual ideas involving 
the imagination without any “definite concept.” Yet only a few pages 
later, he flatly contradicted himself  by invoking the philosopher Epicurus, 
who had insisted that all aesthetic “pleasures, at heart, issue from a bodily 
sensation.”15 Kant’s reasoning aside, this 18th-century fascination with 
“judgments” of  taste or beauty has kept Western thought in its lurch until 
the present day. Conceptual art is but one manifestation of  this disease, 
which unfortunately seems to have no expiration date. 
 Yet the idea of  affordance, which involves the “fit” between 
the human organism and the sensory or action-related qualities of  the 
environment, allows us to approach the idea of  beauty in a different 
way. When people outside of  the arts say that their lover is beautiful 
or that this artistic work is aesthetically satisfying, they are not making 
a conceptual statement. They are referring to a sensory impression, one 
that fits with the action-related qualities of  their immediate environments, 
and one whose intense feeling they have a genuine desire to express. When 
14. Alexander Baumgarten, Aesthetica/Ästhetik (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2007), §1.
15. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Werke in zwölf  Bänden (1977), vol. 10. See paras 
1:113, 54:270, 54:276.
someone stands before this particular mural in the church of  San Vitale in 
Ravenna, one is immediately attracted to the colorful mosaics, but upon 
further study one is also drawn into the enlarged eyes of  the people within 
the retinue of  Empress Theodora. These are eyes into which we read the 
souls of  people who lived almost seventeen hundred years ago. Art history 
books may refer to this particular mural as iconographic, but art historians 
often miss the point. This mural is paradisiacal because it is deeply social 
in its bearing. We say it is beautiful because it tells us something profound 
about ourselves. 
 As another example, let us take the painting Primavera by Sandro 
Botticelli, a work of  the early Italian Renaissance (Figure 3.6). He was 
closely associated with the Medici family in Florence, one of  whom seems 
to have commissioned the work for a wedding. Once again, art history 
textbooks devote nearly all discussion to its iconography. The title of  
the painting, Primavera, of  course, refers to the season of  spring, and the 
rounded bellies of  most of  the ladies portray the ripeness of  the new 
season. The male figure of  Zephyrus on the right, who represents the 
cooler winds of  winter, is about to kidnap the nymph Chloris, whom he 
will wed and transform into the goddess of  spring, Flora, who (after her 
transformation) is the woman in the floral gown scattering rosebuds on 






























vethe ground. Mercury stands at the far left. He was the god of  medicine and 
is therefore another allusion to the Medicis. To his left are the three graces 
of  pleasure, chastity, and beauty, and it is the middle figure chastity, with 
the trim figure, who is about to be nabbed by the arrow of  Eros. Even the 
fact that the painting takes place in an orange grove is representational, 
because oranges were depicted on the Medici coat of  arms.
 It is when we come the haloed figure in the center—Venus, the 
goddess of  love—that we realize something else is going on here. The 
intense sexual overtones of  the figures surrounding her are there to induce 
a particular passion, a lustful feeling for love, yet Venus stands apart. The 
gesticulation of  her right hand is a pose that many early Renaissance 
painters chose for the Madonna in the Annunciation, and the head tilt 
to the right and the facial structure of  Venus is nearly identical to that of  
Mary we saw in the Chartres Cathedral.  We have here a very interesting 
passage between two cultures: the high morality of  Christianity and the 
more carnal or pagan underpinnings of  the new Humanism taking hold—
and not without its peril to the career of  Botticelli himself. 
 We can see this also in Botticelli’s painting of  a few years later, 
The Birth of  Venus, also commissioned for a wedding celebration. A few 
of  the earlier figures reappear, but here the deity born in the clam shell off  
the isle of  Cytherea, which incidentally was always portrayed in mythology 
as a garden paradise, is given center stage.  In her full nudity, we have a 
more human and sensuous figure, yet once again she has the head tilt 
and the somewhat Gothic appearance of  the Madonna. My point is that 
both paintings by Botticelli are social expressions in their subject matter, 
expressions that we experience not through words but through our own 
social and emotional natures. And it is no mystery why these two works 
remain widely recognized as beautiful today. Although executed within 
a distant and somewhat remote culture of  the past, they retain their 
emotional power because of  the rich social expression they so elegantly 
convey. From the perspective of  an affordance, we can say they perfectly 
define the “fit” between the human organism and the sensory or “action-
related” qualities of  the social environment in which we too, in our own 
way, are living.
 It is certainly no coincidence that both paintings were completed 
during the time that another Renaissance writer was completing his erotic 
novel Hypnerotomachia Poliphili, set in a series of  gardens, through which 
Poliphilo must wander to find his true love Polia. He eventually weds her 
at the altar of  Venus on the island of  Cytherea. The interesting thing about 
this novel, written in the spirit of  troubadours, is that while the author 
devotes much time to describing the ravishing beauty of  the nymph Polia, 
he spends an equal, if  not greater amount of  time, describing the various 
gardens he visits as well as the architecture that he discovers. This has led 
at least one architect, Alberto Pérez-Gómez, to argue that architecture 
originates in a similar erotic impulse. I do not contest him in this belief.16 
In fact it might be a way to think of  design once again in paradisiacal 
terms.
 The point of  my foray into the world of  art is twofold. First, I 
believe the profession has today succumbed to what Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno once referred to as the “culture industry.”17 We are 
being forced into a dreary cultural conformity of  Big Brother’s making, 
where the same “art objects” are being restyled or repackaged each new 
season. The city of  Arles or the Philadelphia Museum of  Art does not 
need another museum or addition by Frank Gehry to mark its cultural 
niche. To put it more simply—in focusing on buildings and objects and 
not on the environment field in which we dwell, our priorities are wrong. I 
believe that we need to turn our present thinking around, because Aalto’s 
dream of  paradise, like it or not, is deeply imprinted within our encultured 
natures. Every social compact disassembles when people are unable to 
work within or enjoy their living environments. 
 Second, a viable culture of  beauty has to be built on a solid 
social foundation. The current research on our mirror systems, for 
instance, is today demonstrating that we have a neurological resonance 
with the intentions and feelings of  others, and “these other-within-self  
intersubjective representations,” as Jaak Panksepp and Colwyn Trevarthen 
explain the matter, “establish sympathetic resonances, and intersubjective 
contagions, probably by intrinsic affective systems situated much lower 
than the neocortex, making complementary adjustments to the intelligence 
and feelings expressed in gestures of  other bodies and sensed by sight, 
sound and touch through neocortical processes that are epigenetically 
16. Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Polyphilo, or the Dark Forest Revisited: An Erotic Epiphany of  Archi-
tecture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. xv.
17. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of  Enlightenment, trans. by John Cum-
ming (New York: Continuum, 1989).
18.Jaak Panksepp and Colwyn Trevarthen, “The Neuroscience of  Emotion,” in Stephen 
Malloch and Colwyn Trevarthen Communicative Musicality: Exploring the Basis of  Human 






























veprogramed by experience.”18 The gist of  this statement is that we are 
deeply connected to each other socially or culturally, although the drift of  
society today seems to be moving in the opposite direction.
 Joseph Rykwert, back in the era of  Robert Venturi’s fascination 
with the Las Vegas, warned architects not to succumb to “the techniques 
of  advertising and the nightjoys of  neon,” but rather attend to the physical 
form itself, “the stage on which the action occurs, in his words,” the 
“demarcation of  a place as a social situation”19 (Figure 3.7). The task of  
good designers, he went on to say, is “to clarify, to reconcile, to fortify,” 
and “the savant exercise of  their skill is the real contribution which they 
can make to the creation of  a valid human environment.” Hans-Georg 
Gadamer has similarly argued that every genuine work of  art “signifies 
an increase of  being” or “sensuous abundance,” and when embodied 
in rituals or festivals, it brings people together in a swelling moment of  
conciliation.20 
 Seen in this light, the search for beauty is nothing less than a 
moral and professional obligation. Beauty and the architectural making 
of  culture are, in the end, forms of  ritualistic behavior. And examples of  
human action free of  this ceremonial instinct, as Wendy James has noted, 
“are impossible to find, because all human action relates in some way to 
arenas of  culturally specified significance we participate in with others.”21 
Beauty and culture are in their own way social activities underlying Aalto’s 
vision of  paradise. Both are similarly affordances—those which allow us a 
moment of  fit and fullness, and those which the designer should have the 
calling to create.  
19. Joseph Rykwert, “The Necessity of  Artifice,” in The Necessity of  Artifice (New York: 
Rizzoli, 1982), pp. 58-59.
20. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Relevance of  the Beautiful,” in The Relevance of  the Beautiful 
and Other Essays, trans. by Nicholas Walker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), pp. 35-36.
21. Wendy James, The Ceremonial Animal: A New Portrait of  Anthropology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 6-7.
Figure 3.7: The courtyard of Louis Kahn’s Salk Institutue (1972) gathers the ANFA 
congregation to await the equinox sunset aligning with the central water trough. Here 





































onHow Do Appreciators and Designers Discover Affordances?
James R. Hamilton
Introduction
 Here is the plan. In the first section, I will present the two problems 
I think we need to solve in order to make good on the conference title. 
And I will also make a brief  excursion into evolutionary theory. In §2, I 
will discuss Gibson’s notion of  affordances and some of  his claims about 
understanding the meaning of  what we perceive. In §3, I will discuss the 
notion of  functions as it applies to biology and those artifact kinds we call 
“works of  art;” and then discuss what the notion of  function suggests 
about understanding the meanings of  works of  art. And, in §4, I will draw 
some conclusions about whether our problems are tractable.
 But first, a word about some terms: In this presentation I will use the 
following terms: “design,” “designer,” “maker,” “product,” and “user.” 
For some of  you this usage will be jarring. I mean them as you would apply 
them to those who design, make, and use video games. But, if  you prefer, 
whenever you hear “design” think plan, program, or parti, or whatever term 
you prefer to suggest the thing you dream up (plans and drawings, for example) 
that you plan for someone to make. And, so, if  you do that, whenever I 
use the term “product” think either whatever it is you subsequently present to 
clients or whatever you cause to be built. And, so, then whenever I use the term 
“user” think client and whenever I use the term “maker” think contracter 
or coder, and when I use “designer” think architect, engineer, product designer, 
graphic designer, game designer, or the like. I mean this comment to suggest 
some other ways you might take the terms I will use.
1.a. The problems 
 Recently, a speaker at a presentation at Kansas State University 
flipped a switch on the wall behind her in order to get more light into front 
half  of  the room in which she was speaking. Unfortunately, she flipped 
the wrong switch, and the half  of  the room she wanted to illuminate 
was still in darkness. Yet, by design, each of  the two switches on that wall 
afforded some illumination of  the room. 
 This case illustrates both of  the questions I wish to address today, 
namely: (1) On behalf  of  users, those who would appreciate a product 
(for example, a building or a design element) — how do you come to 
have very high credences that a particular thing, or aspect of  it, is useable 
in some particular way if, in advance, you were not told to expect that it 
is? And (2) – on behalf  of  designers (for example, product designers or 
Figure 4.0: Dr. James R. Hamilton, screen capture from presentation 
in March 2019 at the “Affordance and the Potential for Architecture” 
symposium. An Interface/ANFA event at Kansas State University.
The afforances of  the encironment are what it offers the animals, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb “to afford” is found in the dictionary, but 
the noun “affordance” is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to 
both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies 






































onarchitects) and perhaps makers — what data would you need to encounter 
to increase your credence that you could either use some “contraption” in 
the way it has evolved or design some contraption so that it can be used 
the way you intend it to be used?
 Our two questions are epistemically related: for the data a maker 
or designer would need to encounter to increase her credence that she 
could either use some contraption, design one, or create one to fit users’ 
needs requires those needs first be understood. In addition, for a variety 
of  reasons teachers of  designers and makers must think about this relation 
and pay attention to the fact that the second half  of  it is further divided 
into two parts: on the one hand, there is “the issue of  translating user-
research information in design practice,” and, on the other, there is the 
issue of  “educating students how to understand the complexity of  user’s 
perspectives in their design thinking” (Tvedebrink and Jelic, 2018: 7). The 
second of  these can easily mislead someone if  they are already prone to 
think that user appreciation is purely aesthetic or sense-based. And, while I 
will not discuss this here, the distinction between our aesthetic preferences 
and our artistic verdictive judgments is both large and complex. Be that 
as it may, the first task, that of  “translating user-research information in 
design practice,” directly confronts the problem regarding when and how 
to talk about purposes. And that issue is even further complicated by the 
fact that it only looks amenable to metaphysical solution, whereas it is 
clearly an epistemic matter. (See Schrijver and August 2017, 1; and, for a 
characterization of  metaphysics, see Fine 2017, 98-101.)
1.b. A not entirely unrelated side trip into evolutionary theory
 In the natural context, no purpose is responsible for any change 
in any biological factor; and presumably, when we enter into the “non-
natural” context, factor changes are often the result of  genuinely intelligent 
design: that is, for example, in breeding dogs, cats, seeds. This brings out 
the fact that the only purposes that can be discovered are those responsible 
either for artifacts or for entities that are deliberately manipulated in the 
manner in which artifacts are.1 I mention this in part because it is basic to 
our understanding today that we are concerned with artifacts. Buildings 
and elements of  design, product designs, bits of  furniture, avatars, signage, 
indeed, all these “architectural” or “design” objects are artifacts. 
 The importance of  this comes out by thinking a bit more about 
Darwin. In a 1986 review of  Richard Dawkin’s The Blind Watchmaker, the 
philosopher and historian of  biology, Michael T. Ghiselin remarked that 
Darwin succeeded in replying to Paley in part by showing that natural 
selection could achieve in small steps, over geological time, what Paley 
assumed could only be the “contrivance” of  “a contriver.”2 The other 
part of  his reply was that Darwin “turned the argument from design on 
its head: Nature produces what we might call contraptions rather than 
contrivances. In other words, natural selection predicts both adaptation and 
maladaptation.” It is not too big a leap, nor disrespectful, to remark that 
design by makers does the same thing: it predicts, or at least yields, both 
adaptations and maladaptations, if  I may call them that, to our needs.3 But 
this also highlights the fact that, the fact they are adapted or maladapted is 
not, by itself, enough to ascribe purposes to their being the way that they 
are. We will come back to this.
2. Affordances with a brief note about two views on the 
strategies of neuroscience
 We could of  course set competing accounts of  how to do 
neuroscience side-by-side and see what we think, based on our intuitions. 
But this runs the “risk that [the discussion] will decay into the dull thud 
of  conflicting intuitions” (Bigelow and Pargetter, 1987: 196). Such a 
1. I am neither assuming that only human beings make artifacts nor that dogs, cats, and 
other non-human animals cannot be artifacts (see Sperber 2007). 
2. Gheselin comments that Dawkins “succeeds admirably in showing how natural selec-
tion allows biologists to dispense with such notions as purpose and design”. 
3. Even with respect to artifacts is it not plausible to describe all changes as the result of  
aiming at some purpose or even as the result of  having achieved a purpose; otherwise, 
for example, there would be no unintended consequences of  our actions. 
Figure 4.1: Bank electrical switches on a lecture room wall. But how 






































onconflict could emerge quite naturally by setting Bruineberg and Rietveld 
and others in the 2014 special edition of Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 
on “radical embodied cognitive neuroscience” (Bruineberg and Rietveld 
2014, 1) alongside Vartanian and his colleagues, who offer accounts of  
how specific mechanisms underlie “systematic variations in architectural 
features [leading] to behavioral outcomes” (VartanianEtAl. 2015, 10446). 
For that reason, were I adjudicating between them as empirical views of  
perception, I would stress the importance of  the theoretical grounds for and 
against the various tendencies in neuroscience and neuroaesthetics. 
 However, I will discuss the topic of  this section only within the 
constraints of  a particular account of  what “affordances” are, and I will 
not attempt the daunting task of  asking which of  those two views of  
neuroscience, if  either, reflects the correct empirical (or metaphysical) 
view.4 
 Many ecological psychologists themselves think that, at least to 
date, the notion of  “affordances” is not explained well, and there are 
various accounts of  how his notion of  affordances leads, or doesn’t, to 
Gibson’s notions of  “direct perception” and “atmosphere” (McGrenere 
and Ho 2000, Chemero 2003, Scarantino 2003, Tvedebrink and Jelic 
2018).5 Even when they say they are “going back to J. J. Gibson’s early 
formulation,” there is still quite a bit of  what might be called “selection” 
going on. Be that as it may, we can still make some progress by focusing 
on this definition offered for “affordances” by Gibson himself:
 
 
4.If  it is treated as an entrée into the metaphysical debate about the nature of  perception, 
then, in fact, I believe that can only result in the dull thud effect; for, I suspect, the 
metaphysically inclined have only their intuitions upon which to rely and there is no 
genuinely impartial and empirical way to determine which of  them has greater utility. 
5.Chemero 2003 (182-184) has a very nice introduction to some other ways of  
understanding affordances. 
6.Note that it is Gibson’s idea that I am discussing, not the more popularly and 
widely used idea of  “affordances” found in the work of  Donald Norman. (Norman 
1993/2013). 
 There are two claims in this formulation that must be attended 
to. The first is that affordances are provided by the environment and to the 
animal (including non-human animals). The second is that the term implies 
something, namely “complementarity” between animal and environment. 
The first claim is easily misunderstood as denying Darwinian evolutionary 
theory because it may seem to suggest there are purposes lying behind 
those offerings; but Gibson was quite emphatic that it did not. This can be 
explained by thinking about what “complementarity” in the second claim 
is supposed to mean. Here is one gloss: 
 
On the other hand, Gibson took phenomenologists to assume that “the 
valence of  an object is bestowed upon it in experience, and bestowed by a 
need of  the observer” (Gibson 2015, 130).7  But he denied this, claiming 
instead that an affordance can be present in an environment even if  an 
agent never perceives it (Gibson 2015, 130).
 The relation of  Gibson’s idea of  affordances to the phenomena 
describable in the standard terms of  physics deserves special mention. 
As Gibson notes in the quotation above, and in many other places in his 
discussions, the idea of  affordances is not within the sphere of  what can 
be described in standard physics. But it is consistent with it – he was not 
suggesting we go back to the ages before Galileo, Descartes, Newton, 
and Darwin. The abstractions that were embedded in those scientific 
achievements came at a cost, namely, that what was available in the ages 
before the scientific revolution was a way of  describing the lived in world 
7.This looks like a metaphysical view about the nature of  our perceptions, and perhaps 
that is what it is. If  so, it is outside my purview to adjudicate between that view and its 
competitors – and if  it is not a metaphysical view then it is an empirical view (and none 
of  us at this mini-conference is in a position to render views about empirical matters). 
The “affordances” of  the environment are what it “offers” the animal, 
what it “provides” or “furnishes,” either for good or ill. The verb 
to “afford” is found in the dictionary, but the noun “affordance” is 
not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both 
the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. 
It implies the complementarity of  the animal and the environment 
(Gibson 1979/2015, 119; emphases in original).6
Gibson introduced affordances to capture what he took to be the 
essential “complementarity” between organisms and environment. 
He believed such complementarity could be lost in two different ways, 
exemplified respectively by the languages of  physics and phenomenology. 
Physics employs basic explanatory properties such as mass, charge, 
spin. These are paradigmatic objective properties, namely, properties 
instantiated independently of  any actual or potential response to the 
property bearer on the part of  organisms…. [However,] what the 
organism is a perceiver of, and a behaver in, are environments (or 
niches). Gibson’s idea is that the organism and the environment make 
an inseparable pair, where each term has to be understood relative to the 





































onthat was precisely what was abstracted from in order to make those 
achievements possible. That such abstraction achieved a great deal in gains 
with respect to offering true theories of  mathematics and about the world 
is undeniable. But every achievement requiring abstraction has objective 
losses as well as and gains. And here, Gibson focuses on losses.
 In particular, what was lost in the subsequent account of  
perception was the fact that perception came to be thought of  as 
independent of  the life of  the perceiving animal and of  the function of  
the object being perceived as well. In contrast he claimed that perception 
is “relative” to both (Gibson 2015, 120). 
 “If  we assume that [an object] can be distinguished as having just 
these properties [of  affording us a place to sit], it should look [like it can 
be sat on, and] if  the surface properties [of  that object] are seen relative 
to the body surfaces, the self, they constitute a seat and have meaning” 
(Gibson 2015, 120). 
And, so, he was led to this: 
 In this and a number of  other passages Gibson might appear to 
conflate “perception,” which can be sub-personal (i.e., occurring below the 
level of  personal awareness) and “attention,” which almost never is – and, 
whether he did so or not, this has likely been the cause of  much mischief  
when others have been tempted to adopt various of  these ideas. But what 
it comes to is just that what we normally perceive when we look at objects 
are not the features of  an object that would be useful in “discriminat[ing] 
the dimension[s] of  their difference[s]” nor noting the “special quality of  
objects into which an object can be analyzed,” but only those features of  
an object that are useful to us as living creatures in a lived environment.
 However, what I want to call attention to and challenge in this 
presentation is the idea that one can get an understanding of  the object in 
any important sense for free just by perceiving or attending to an object. 
This can be seen by asking what sort of  meaning it is that arises from 
perceiving or attending to whatever makes some object look like, for 
example, a seat? To be sure, Gibson’s attention was elsewhere when he 
wrote this book. Indeed, he thought that: “The central question for the 
theory of  affordances is not whether they exist and are real but whether 
information is available in ambient light for perceiving them” (Gibson 
2015, 132).
 Consequently, Gibson spent a good deal of  space and time 
examining, or at least confirming, that such information is indeed available 
in ambient light. And then in an attempt to make his theory internally 
consistent, and get at what he called “direct perception,” he described 
what he calls “information pick up” as an alternative to “information 
processing” (Gibson 2015, 139-161). But I am not going to discuss that 
aspect of  his view; and instead will concentrate on the distinction I have 
just mentioned between perceiving one kind of  “meaning” and gaining 
“understanding.”
Figure 4.2: Performative Affordances. As opportunities for action, affordances 
always imply bodily coupling, they are shapes in the world that shape the body 
and vice-versa. Performative affordances are designed with a specific purpose, 
to evoke a prescribed response. This does not mean that the affordance will 
not perform other unforeseen gestures and responses, but that it is configured 
according to a very specific purpose. An outstanding example of an umwelt with 
nested performative affordances that work in concert in a dynamic system is Alvar 
Aalto’s Paimio Sanatorium—this is a rare example of a building that was intended 
to do, rather than being an assemblage of “esthetically pleasing forms,” yet whose 
outcome is exceedingly pleasing.
I now suggest that what we perceive when we look at objects are their 
affordances, not their qualities. We can discriminate the dimensions of  
difference if  required to do so in an experiment, but what the object 
affords us is what we “normally pay attention to.” The special quality 
of  objects into which an object can be analyzed is ordinarily not noticed 






































 You will recall that we said we would come back to the point that 
adaptations and maladaptations – even to needs – do not, by themselves, 
entail the presence of  purposes such as the meeting of  needs. This is 
reflected, perhaps, in Gibson’s idea of  affordances. It is certainly behind 
the debate about the functions, purposes, and goals of  artifacts, as that 
has played out among historians and philosophers of  science. And I want 
to use a brief  rehearsal of  the philosophical discussion of  functions to 
bring out the problem I have just hinted at that can be rooted in Gibson’s 
idea of  how human beings and other animals perceive, and what it is they 
perceive, by rehearsing a bit of  the philosophical discussion of  functions 
in biology as well as in artifacts. 
3.a. Functions in biology
 Philosophical discussions of  functions have been around since 
Aristotle who held the commonsense view that functions are in objects 
by means of  the designs of  their designer(s). It followed, as William 
Paley noted, that if  you could discover a function in biology (such as the 
function of  the eye), you could assume there was a designer lurking in the 
wings. (Although, even based on this evidence alone, you might not know 
how well-designed the object is compared to other such organs and, so, how 
good, bad, or mediocre, the designer was.) But, ever since Darwin, this 
kind of  explanation of  at least natural functions – which seem endemic 
in biological theories – will no longer work. Either one no longer sees 
room for functional explanations in biology, and so declares all functional 
talk among biologists to be metaphorical, or one gives some sort of  
“naturalistic” account of  the term and so makes it possible to continue to 
understand it literally (Godfrey-Smith 1993, 189-191).
 The notions I will quickly sketch here are all attempts at 
providing a naturalistic account of  the term. Some of  them are grounded 
in what everyone might say – and so are connected to the project of  
offering so-called “conceptual analyses” of  the term and are refutable by 
counterexamples. Others restrict their discussion just to what biologists 
and others need in order to continue talk about functions in some literal 
way and tend to be disconnected to conceptual analysis offering, in 
contrast, theoretical definitions of  the term which are only refutable if  
they turn out to have less utility for scientific uses.8 
8. How this is currently determined is by means of  some sort of  Bayesian analysis of  
theoretical utility. 
 Of  the former kind, one should list Larry Wright’s 1973 account 
in an essay on the use of  functional terms in biology in which he focused 
attention on the idea that functions are appealed to when explaining the 
presence or continued existence of  a feature in some organism. Such an 
explanation, in particular, allowed us to distinguish between functional 
properties that an organism had and the accidental properties it might 
well also have. “The function of  the heart is pumping blood,” Wright 
wrote, “not producing a thumping noise or making wiggly lines on 
electrocardiograms, which are also things it does” (Wright 1973, 141).
Robert Cummins nearly immediately noted that “an attempt to explain 
the presence of  something by appeal to what it does – its function – is 
bound to leave unexplained why something else that does the same thing 
– a functional equivalent – isn’t there instead” (Cummins 1975, 745). He 
offered the contrasting view that “the function of  an organ or process 
(or whatever) is appealed to [in order] to explain the biological capacities 
of  the organism containing it, and from these capacities conclusions are 
drawn concerning the chances of  survival for organisms of  that type” 
(Cummins 1975, 751).9
 Peter Achinstein offered yet a third view in 1977 arguing for 
a substantially different idea and denying that “function sentences,” as 
he called them, rarely are offered to explain the existence or continued 
existence of  any features. “Function sentences” all aim to attribute a 
function to some means to an end and such that “for any function there 
is an associated end which can be formulated in a propositional way” 
(Achinstein 1977, 360, my emphasis). Almost a decade later, John Bigelow 




9. There is more to this, with respect to explaining “capacity” talk, for example. But this 
suffices for present purposes. Also see Godfrey-Smith 1993, 201-207, for an explanation 
of  why there is no unification of  these several ideas about the functions of  natural or 
artifactual objects. 
“Functions,” they noted, “can be characterized by reference to possibly 
nonexistent future events. Furthermore, they should be characterized 
that way, because only then will they play the explanatory role they 
need to play, for instance, in biology. The way to construe functions in 
a forward-looking manner, we suggest, is (roughly) to construe them in 





































onThis view has come to be called “the propensity” account of  biological 
functions.10 What marks it off  from the predecessors was not only that 
it targeted what biologists would be inclined to say – rather than just 
everyone – but also that it was offering a theoretical definition, one whose 
relative correctness would be measured not by how well it squared with 
everyday talk but would be measured only by its utility among biologists 
and other scientists.
 The last view I will survey in this brief  account occurs in Ruth G. 
Millikan’s historical-biological account of  functions which holds that: 
 
 This too is intended to be a technical definition, focusing on the 
actual histories of  the actual organisms and artifacts that we encounter in 
biology, psychology, art history, and so on.
 The common theme that I want to stress in these various 
discussions of  functions – both natural and artifactual, and both standardly 
analytic and theoretical – is a reluctance to endorse, even sometimes in the 
cases where there are intentional agents, the force of  those intentions in 
explaining the functions that artifacts have. This is not only motivated by the 
widely (and correctly) reported idea that users might interpret the design 
of  the artifact along intentional lines that the maker did not have, but 
instead has been pushed forward by the view that , roughly, the functions 
of  artifacts are no more determined by the intentions of  the designers or 
makers, even though clearly those agents often do have intentions directed 
at creating objects with functions, than are the functions of  natural objects. 
 Instead, the functions of  artifacts are determined by whether 
the objects so produced (i.e., produced intentionally) have features that 
continue to be responsible for what those objects are, why they continue 
to exist, or how they contribute to further functionally defined ends; 
however, they came to have those features. The epistemic corollary of  this 
claim is that agents who grasp the functions of  objects – again whether 
the object has that function by nature or by design – do so by grasping 
the features of  the objects that are responsible for what those objects are, 
why they continue to exist, or how the contribute to further functionally 
defined ends, independently of  any knowledge (or lack of  it) concerning 
how those objects came to have the functions that they did.
3.b. Functions in works of art
 Interpretations of  works of  art – which correspond to what 
architects often call “readings” of  buildings – are aimed at a grasp of  
what most philosophers of  art have called “understanding.” Now none 
of  us owns that word, so I take this to be a technical usage whose merit, 
or demerit, will depend on its usefulness. But this is the sense of  the word 
that is important to us. It concerns what the work is for, is about, or means. 
 Note this is not the same sense of  “means” that we encountered 
earlier when discussing Gibson’s idea of  the objects of  perception. There 
we were concerned only with perceiving affordances, which came just to 
this: the most we can get from a perception of  an affordance is a possible 
function the object has relative to some particular animal. We do not 
usually get the work’s actual function, if  any, or even a full account of  the 
functions of  its parts, again if  any (they may have none). So, this does not 
get us an interpretation – and understanding – of  the work of  art in the 
sense we need in order to evaluate the work as successful or not. For it 
does not even get us to a sense of  what the work – in this case a designed 
space – is for, let alone what it is about, or might mean to someone (or, 
in the possibly non-existent case, to everyone). And this entails that it 
does not get us genuine understanding of  a work of  art for free, just by 
perceiving it or by attending to it.
 In other words, the same wariness of  authorial intentions that is 
present in philosophical discussions of  functions in biology and artifacts 
is now a commonplace view – although not the dominant view – within 
philosophy of  art (Irvin 2006; Nathan 2006). Grasping the function of  an 
[T]he definition of  “proper function” looks to history rather than 
merely to present properties or dispositions to determine function. Easy 
cases of  items having proper functions are body organs and instinctive 
behaviors. A proper function of  such an organ or behavior is, roughly, 
a function that its ancestors have performed that has helped account 
for proliferation of  the genes responsible for it, hence helped account 
for its own existence. But the definition of  “proper function” covers, 
univocally, the functions of  many other items as well, including the 
functions of  learned behaviors, reasoned behaviors, customs, language 
devices such as words and syntactic forms, and artifacts (Millikan 
1989, 289). 
10. There is more to this as well, and the actual argument, only suggested here, appears on 





































onwork of  art, like grasping the function of  any artifact that has one – such 
as a product designed to have a function (for example, a chair or a video 
game) – is not done by grasping the intention with which it was made but 
by grasping features of  the object itself, the ones responsible either for its 
existence, its continued existence, or its contribution to other functionally 
defined ends. Interestingly, this comports well with what Gibson has to 
say when he claims we do not perceive the features of  objects but only 
their affordances. This we have glossed as consistent with physics and the 
cartesian coordinate system – as Gibson seems to have intended – and as 
grasping those features of  an object that appear to be useful to us as living 
creatures in a lived environment.11
4. Are the problems tractable?
 You may recall our two questions: (1) On behalf  of  users, those 
who would appreciate a product (for example, a building or a design 
element) — how do you come to have very high credences that a particular 
thing, or aspect of  it, is useable in some particular way if, in advance, you 
were not told to expect that it is? And (2) – on behalf  of  designers (for 
example, product designers or architects) and perhaps makers — what 
data would you need to encounter to increase your credence that you 
could either use some “contraption” in the way it has evolved or design 
some contraption so that it can be used the way you intend it to be used? 
It will come as no surprise when I answer the first question with a “No,” 
at least not without understanding. But this requires inference. This form 
of  understanding involves having prior expectations and then, crucially, 
updating conditional on the data you – the user – are presented. In this 
case, clearly a part of  those expectations will be having been told what to 
expect, and the data will be the experiences the user has – which very well 
may consist largely of  perceptions of  the affordances of  the objects the 
user is presented with.
 The situation concerning question (2) is clearly more complicated. 
Even if  you can count on people reasoning in accord with what you have 
built in to the design by way of  affordances, affordances are, remember, 
relative to particular human animals. So this will require you to know who 
those particular human beings are, what their socio/cultural background is, 
what is common among them in terms of  social biases, perceptual abilities 
or capacities (and incapacities as well – such as the blind spot that each 
Figure 4.3: Panel discussion following the presentations at the Interface event 28 March 
2018, in Regnier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas.  From left to right Dr. Harry Mallgrave, Sarah 
Robinson (with microphone), and Dr. James Hamilton.  
of  our eyes contains, the human susceptibility to “change blindness,” and 
the persistent effects of  “inattentional blindness), and so on. In short, 
even on a theory of  affordances, there is much the designer must do by 
way of  data collection and inferential reasoning in order to increase their 
credences that some contraption they have designed will work. There is 
no shortcut to understanding on the part of  appreciators, and none on the 
part of  designers who design things for them.
11. This seems to be what Gibson means, even though this result also seems to challenge 
some of  what he says about “direct perception.”
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Architecture is Something We Do: A Postscript 
Bob Condia
As we are arranging this concise manuscript for publication, I sense, or 
better realize that it will be an important contribution to our thinking 
about architecture, space, and perception. Quite simply, Affordances 
and the Potential for Architecture discloses that our engagement with 
architecture or the built environment is a deeply rooted experience 
operating on many levels. In a biological and philosophical sense, it reveals 
that the mind is inseparable from the body, just as the body is inseparable 
from its environment. It displays the world before us as rife with potential 
movements, activities, engagements, for which we continuously rehearse 
the myriad possibilities and choose the best course of  action. It defines 
our phenomenological natures through our readiness-for-action, and it 
thereby suggests that we can improve the spaces, buildings, and landscapes 
that we inhabit by mastering how we enact and understand them. 
We are grateful to Andrea Jelić for her contribution, “Introduction: 
Designing Affordances for the Living-Lived Body?” She begins with the 
tender probe of  “How architecture affords being-in-the-world?”  And, as 
she suggests, its value lies in the pervasiveness of  the question.  Recognizing 
the general conceit of  humans historically toward abstraction, toward 
separating the mind from the body and the body from its situation—
she frames our scaffold for experience as one of  environmental mutual 
dependenc rather than of  detachment.  The primacy of  our sensory 
perception nesting in the body is the story unfolding in the discoveries of  
the newer models of  cognition, much along the ecological lines of  James 
Gibson’s thesis of  affordances. Can the idea of  affordances contribute to 
the decisions that architects make?  It will certainly add new dimensions 
to thought processes. 
Sarah Robinson, in “Articulating Affordances: Towards a New Theory of  
Design,” makes the same case.  Beginning as she does with the rocking 
chair’s animation of  the porch, she demonstrates that one size doesn’t 
fit all.  Even as our bodies are similarly constituted and share much 
in common, it is the specificity of  differences between us that should 
instruct designers. There is no “average” body size or standard fighter 
Affordances and the Potential for Architecture 
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 “An important fact about the affordances of 
the environment is that they are in a sense 
objective, real, and physical, unlike values and 
meanings, which are often supposed to be 
subjective, phenomenal, and mental. . . . It is 
equally a fact of the environment and a fact of 
behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet 
neither. An affordance points both ways, to the 
environment and to the observer.”  
(J.J. Gibson, 1979/86, p. 129) 
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pilot. Instead, there is a poetic double entendre which asks professionals 
to understand perception as the active confluence of  varying influences 
(from personal to bounded), all the while considering the particularities 
of  the individual person.  A theory of  affordances recognizes that while 
the rocking chair will always provide an affordance of  rocking, its activity 
depends on its location and the frame of  mind of  the person so engaged. 
Such real participation in life, like rocking in a chair, is the real beauty of  
an architectural moment.  
In his essay “Just What Can Architects Afford?” Harry Mallgrave advocates 
that, after decades of  reducing form to conceptual gamesmanship and 
usurping models with little kinship to design, one must raise the question 
of  where this has left the practice of  design? Has it improved our cities 
or our houses? In the face of  the mounting evidence to a contrary, and 
in view of  the complexity of  human life, wants, and desires, shall we 
mindlessly follow the same track?  The newer biological models disclose 
in no uncertain terms that our engagement with buildings and landscapes 
is “a whole-body experience,” one grounded not only in our multisensory, 
emotional, and visceral responses to the world but also in the phenomenal 
or “lived” nature of  our being. Standing against the hollowing of  human 
nature in contemporary digital practice—and with it our existential desire 
for seduction—Mallgrave offers the lesson that we are indeed active agents 
in the culture that we create, and this built world can indeed be attuned 
to our biological and social natures. Thinking of  beauty, he suggests, is 
also something we do; it is yet another expression of  the vital paradisiacal 
instinct grounded in human nature.
James Hamilton, isn’t concerned with beauty, but with, “How do 
Appreciators and Designers Discover Affordances?” He assigns to 
himself  the difficult task of  arbitrating for the ‘user,’ who might 
appreciate a building, while at the same time distrusting the designer to 
grasp the real intention of  the things they make. In a scholarly way, he 
does so by examining Gibson’s claims for affordances, and questioning 
the basis for understanding how objects appear to us or are useful within 
a specific environment.  It seems that affordances have much to do with 
the experience or understanding you bring to the artifact. You have to see 
a chair as a chair in order to sit in a chair. A secondary and more difficult 
notion here is that even if  a designer designs a chair, it may still be at odds 
with the peculiarities of  the individual.  As he himself  concludes, “There 
is no shortcut to understanding on the part of  appreciators, and none on 
the part of  designers who design things for them.”
I often hear architects say they must educate their clients, yet in order to 
make this strategy work, designers must be better educated in the needs, 
wants, and desires of  their clients.  Affordances are a way to understand 
the environmental actions and behaviors of  our species, while recognizing 
that which makes us human with individual needs.   One size never fits 
all, although it begins in a common humanity.   Taken in sum, these essays 
consider the model of  affordances within the context of  architecture and 
provide a valuable contribution to this discussion of  how to conceive, 
think, and better attune the human organism with the environment in 
which we dwell.
This symposium was the second Interfaces event of  ANFA (the Academy 
of  Neuroscience for Architecture, Salk Institute) held 28 March 2019 in 
the Regnier Forum of  APDesign, Kansas State University. Instituted by 
the ANFA Advisory Council under the encouragement of  the ANFA 
Board. The event was sponsored by the HOK Studio and the Regnier 
Chair in Architectural Research. In acknowledgement, let me extend our 
gratitude to Victor Regnier for his continued support to the Department 
of  Architecture’s Regnier Chair for Research; to HOK Architects, 
especially the Kansas City Office, for their support of  a thesis design 
studio offering the fruits of  neuroscience for architectural consideration. 
A particular thanks goes to Michael Arbib, Chair of  the ANFA Advisory 
Board, challenging the community of  architects and scientists to increase 
our discussion. My personal gratitude goes the fine staff  of  P\Lab2003S: 
Shea Ensor, Marilina Bedros, Dakota Smith, Jaasiel Duarte-Terrazas, 
and Alexandra Mesias for organizing the details and staffing the event. 
We deeply appreciate graphic efforts of  Kaden Beilman, Dakota and 
Alexandra. A special recognition to Dr. Thomas Bell for the copy editing. 
We thank the ANFA Board for allowing us to carry their good name, 
particularly Fred Marks and Matthew Smith, and we salute Andrea, Sarah, 
Harry and Jim for their contributions to this symposium and advancing 
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